Showing posts with label corruption. Show all posts
Showing posts with label corruption. Show all posts

Friday, 28 July 2017

For journalists who hate economics

OPEC barrel price evolution. In red: dollars. In blue: 1998 dollars
If you read in English and you want to learn how to do some real investigative journalism on Venezuela, you should read people such as Alexandra Ulmer, Keyal Vyas or Girish Gupta.

If you want something very superficial, you should read something like BBC news in English, particularly if the journalist is a native English speaker. It is really amazing how the British organisation can make news about Venezuela sound so trite.

We constantly hear and read sinking oil prices are the major cause of Venezuela's collapse. 

We can read about that on BBC here and here.

But this is highly inaccurate. Yes, prices do have a role to play on the hardships Venezuela is going through now. Still, a much more important reason for the misery is the sheer corruption and incompetence of Chavismo. This is something BBC journalists do not seem to grasp because they do not seem to take their time to learn about the long term evolution of Venezuela's economy and society. For them, it seems, there is not much time to try to understand what exactly were the conditions in Venezuela in 2007, in 1998, in 1992 and much less before that.

The BBC work in Venezuela resembles more or less like this: they interview a state employee, they interview some opposition economist or politician, they quote one, they quote the other and they do not care or are not given the time to do proper research, listen to more nuanced, more complex reports, try to understand at least the basics of how economies function. The way BBC reports on Venezuela I simply cannot imagine their journalists ever have taken a look of more than 1 second to a chart showing the evolution of life expectancies in several Latin American countries across decades or GDP growth in Venezuela since 1962 or even less trying to analyse what kind of things Venezuela was exporting in 1998 apart from oil and what it does now or what kind of education programmes there were in the sixties, eighties or now.

If you take a not too short sighted view of the matter you will soon realise oil prices now are still higher than they were in the late nineties, shortly before the military coup monger Chavez got elected...and yet living conditions now are considerable worse than back in 1998. The average price for a barrel of OPEC oil in 2017 is around 49.77 dollars. That is about 33.75 dollars of 1998. Back then Venezuela was getting less than 13 dollars for a barrel. Even if we accounted for population growth: Maduro's government should be getting more money than the government of Caldera II. What a lot of foreign journalists still fail to see is the sheer amount of corruption and utter incompetence that have thrived in the Chavismo years. Chavismo will probably make Mobutu's regime look like "nearly Swedish standards" on accountability.

Yes, for many decades the popularity of Venezuelan presidents has gone up and down according to oil prices. Oil prices enabled Chavez to have available more social programmes than what presidents had in the decade that immediately preceded him, when we had the longest oil recession. Still, the loss of popularity has more to do with the level of plundering that has taken place in Venezuela.




Sunday, 14 May 2017

The Chavista elite abroad


Venezuela was for most of its history a country of immigrants. Two periods stand up as big exceptions to this. The first was the war of independence and the second the long economic collapse that started to be felt in the nineties of the XX century and that is reaching increasingly terrible levels at this very moment.

Now there are Venezuelan communities in almost every country on Earth, something someone would nave found hard to believe 30 years ago. An awful lot of highly qualified Venezuelans live from Canada to Norway, from Argentina to Australia. Venezuelans are also emigrating by plane or bus and even in boats, like desperate Cubans, trying to reach Aruba, Curaçao and Bonaire.

But there are the other Venezuelans, the ones who have become very rich in the so-called Bolivarian revolution. When most Venezuelans have no access to dollars, the socialist boligarchs travel abroad in all luxury.

Venezuelans have decided to bug them. We could recently see on social media how the daughter of communist minister Rodriguez is approached by other Venezuelans in Bonti beach, Australia, and asked whether she doesn't feel something for what is happening in our country. The former defense minister gets caught in a restaurant in France and gets booed. Another former minister of Chavez has to get out of a restaurant in Doral, Florida, after Venezuelans recognise him and shout at him 'thief, get out'.

Bear in mind this: Venezuela has a foreign currency control that only promotes corruption.
If you are Venezuelan and you live in Venezuela you can only afford to travel abroad if you are richer than 99.5% of the population or someone abroad finances you.

Let''s see where boligarchs have been spotted abroad:

Former defence minister eating out in Paris, her children study there

Former minister Vázquez Orellana eating out in Miami

A well-known singer tweeted that the daughter of current defence minister Vladimir Padrino was spending some money in a posh area of Madrid

If you know of other cases, please let me know, preferably with a good url.

Monday, 12 September 2016

Venezuela, Rusia, armas y más corrupción


Lenta informa sobre el juicio en Moscú al ex-senador ruso Sergey Popelnyujovym por fraude en el proyecto de la fábrica de kalashnikovs en Venezuela.

El caudillo Chávez había  firmado un contrato con los rusos en 2001 para que se construyera una fábrica de kalashnikovs en Venezuela que produjera unas 25000 armas anualmente. Popelnyujovym tenía amigos en la empresa estatal Rosoboronexport, de la que he escrito anteriormente, y consiguió a través de estos una participación en el proyecto.

Popelnyojovym, dicen ingenieros, trabajadores y contratistas, no les pagó durante meses. Estos trataron de reclamar las deudas, pero este los evitó. Al parecer, el diario Lenta escribió a la embajada rusa en Caracas y tampoco recibió respuesta de lo que pasaba. Los ingenieros finalmente se dirigieron al gobierno ruso. En 2015 miembros de Rosoboronexport decían que la culpa de los retrasos era de los venezolanos.

Finalmente, el juzgado de Tver detuvo a Popelnyujovin el 4 de junio de 2015. Desde aquel entonces este ha mantenido que la culpa de los retrasos es de los venezolanos y de Rosoboronexport y que se ha logrado construir casi toda la fábrica.

Entre los elementos que se discuten en el juicio es el papel de CAVIM, que habría recibido mil millones de rublos o más de 16 millones de euros en aquel entonces.

Pueden encontrar algo en castellano sobre este asunto aquí (de 2015) y aquí (marzo de 2016).

Sería interesante si la oposición venezolana distribuyese volantes a las personas que hacen filas para comprar comida con preguntas sobre el papel de CAVIM y de los militares en general en todos estos negocios.

Sería también interesante si nuestros diputados exigen de manera pública a los militares chavistas que expliquen qué es lo que está pasando en ese juicio y qué hay de las aseveraciones de Rosoboronexport y de Popelnyujovin.

Mientras este juicio prosigue y el hambre aumenta en Venezuela, el régimen chavista planifica nuevas compras de armas. Lenta cita al experto de armas Frolov, quien dice que pronto Venezuela comprará al menos una decena de Sujoy 30MK.

Sunday, 11 September 2016

Switzerland and Chavismo's corruption


If you read French, you should take a look at this article summing up some of the corruption scandals related to Chavistas and Swiss banks.

Hats off to Swiss journalist Alexandra Ulmer.

One of the thugs holding power in Venezuela loves Swiss watches... ohter Chavistas love Swiss banking secrecy

Wednesday, 3 August 2016

Crimes, Chavismo and predictability

Sometimes the Chavista regime can be more predictable than other times. For instance, when the United States of America announces one of the Chavista honchos will be prosecuted for serious crimes, the Venezuelan regime feels the need to promote the accused.

That is what happened in January 2012: USA announced Henry Rangel Silva, among other Chavista military strongmen, was involved in drug trafficking. Lo and behold: Chávez named him minister of Defence.

Another military, Gustavo González, was among those the States decided to sanction for their responsibility in human rights violantions during the 2014 protests. Maduro made him minister of Interior.

Now the USA, after a long investigation, declared Néstor Reverol was a drug dealer and Maduro announced Reverol will be the next minister of Interior. There is a certain modus operandi.

And while Maduro is giving awards to criminals, you can read a very good but extremely sad article Alexandra Ulmer wrote about how women in Venezuela now seek sterilization in order to avoid child-rearing. 

Only the First Lady's cousins won't be able to become ministers in a US prison

Sunday, 31 July 2016

All of us helping to bring the end of Chavismo

Oil tanker in the Lake of Venezuela

Alexandra Ullmer and Girish Gupta produced a great little article based on good investigative work. Their research shows how a well-known Colombian supporter of Chavismo, Alex Saab, can be linked to a company that was trying to pocket a huge contract with PDVSA, Venezuela's once solid and now crumbling state oil company.

Venezuelan blogger Alex Boyd had written about Saab before. You can read him in Spanish here and in English more recently here.

Now: why do I bring up that title? Because I want to ask you - yes you - to use a tiny bit of your free time some day to expand the Wikipedia articles related to corruption in Venezuela

You can write in Spanish here, in English here and in German here. Remember: be more kosher than the rabbi and more Catholic than the Pope when it comes to objectivity. It's Wikipedia. Avoid using blogs as direct references - yes, as painful as it is for a blogger- and prefer the most respected references from well-known news agencies and from books. Remember: there are a lot of Chavismo apologists out there who would remove anything from Wikipedia that may be critical of the regime unless the sources are very well selected and the wording is spotless for Wikipedia standards.

Chavismo will collapse only when the thugs in power realize jail for them is unavoidable if they keep a single minute there. Each one of us can accelerate that moment by painstakingly documenting Chavistas' crimes. Wikipedia is just one of many means but one that should not be underestimated.




Saturday, 21 March 2015

Algunas preguntas




  1. ¿Pueden los países de UNASUR seguir colaborando con la dictadura venezolana por mucho tiempo con el fin de mantener sus relaciones económicas como están?
  2. ¿Cuándo va a anunciar el CNE las elecciones parlamentarias?
  3. ¿Cómo va el CNE a tratar de realizar una vez más gerrymandering?
  4. ¿Cuántos candidatos eligirán a dedo los partidos de oposición de entre los prisioneros que Maduro tiene en las cárceles y cuántos de estos lograrán salir de las cárceles en caso de ser electos?
  5. ¿Por qué el ex presidente colombiano y jefe de UNASUR, el colombiano Samper, anunció que las elecciones serían en septiembre? (para luego retractarse)
  6. ¿Por qué la oposición venezolana apenas ha exigido al régimen venezolano que declare quiénes están implicados en el escándalo de las cuentas en Andorra?
  7. ¿Es socialista el hermano del ex ministro de interior Rodríguez Torres, que tiene una finca de 500 hectáreas
  8. ¿Con qué dinero compró dicha finca?
  9. ¿Cuándo anunciará el gobierno de Maduro un nuevo supuesto atentado contra él?
  10. ¿Cuándo anunciará el gobierno de Maduro un nuevo supuesto golpe de Estado?
  11. ¿Cuántos kilos de carne importada logrará repartir el gobierno de Maduro antes de las elecciones parlamentarias?
  12. ¿Cómo se sentirá en Venezuela el precio del petróleo a finales de abril?
  13. ¿Puede Maduro canalizar algo del dinero que los chinos le prestaron a Venezuela para uso exclusivo de proyectos petrolíficos en la compra de votos?
  14. ¿Cómo aumentará el ejército la manipulación de centros electorales?



Monday, 9 February 2015

Swiss Leaks and Chavismo



Wao. Look at this.

With regards to Venezuela we have this:


  • Venezuelans as a nation hold position 3 when it comes to the total amount of money they have in secret accounts in Switzerland
  • One of the key Venezuelans with a Swiss account is Alejandro Andrade, a military coup monger who helped Chávez during his bloody coup of 1992. You can read old stuff about Andrade here (in English) and a bit less here (in Spanish). 

To be continued...
Queso suizo!, we will say in Spanish

Saturday, 7 February 2015

The Latin American country other Latin American countries have left to rot


The Chavista Intelligence Service interrogated for three hours Carlos Rosales, president of the Federation of Clinics, after he told journalists about the shortage of medical supplies in Venezuela. Numbers differ a lot according to whom you ask. Cristino García, president of the Federation of Nurses of Venezuela, said one out of four items you need to have at a hospital is not available. According to the vice-president of the Federation of Clinics, it's four out of five. That's quite a difference. The discrepancy has to do in part with the fact there is not one methodology to define what shortage of a product is in the case of hospitals and with the political position of the one being asked. But in any case: there are huge shortages. You just have to go to Venezuela and ask people about their experiences trying to find Paracetamol or products for blood pressure or the like.

Bear in mind this: since about 2004 Venezuelan hospitals and clinics are being regularly looted by part of its workers and by outsiders linked to those workers. The reasons are complex:
  • public hospitals are now managed by people whose main qualification is to be loyal to the regime, nothing else
  • the currency control that gives a preferential rate of an already overvalued currency to medical supplies make these resale of these goods even more profitable
  • people don't earn enough with normal jobs
  • the general social decay generated by an ever more corrupt country where there is no division of powers strengthens the process.
Maduro declared that the Día a Día supermarket chain will be taken over by PDVAL. This, of course, means more corruption and more power to the military controlling the chain.

Yesterday was a very sad day for Venezuelan democrats: Zapata, one of the best political cartoonists we had, passed away. He was 85. Here you have one of his last cartoons:

"There are only two types of people: those who think like me...
and the traitors of the Fatherland"

You can find out a little bit about his mood lately if you read his last tweets.


Sunday, 1 February 2015

Ein Deutscher, der über Venezuela als Journalist schreiben will

Heute habe ich diesen Text von Raul Zelik gelesen. Er kommt ab und zu bei deutschen Medien vor, um über Venezuela zu reden. In seinem jetzigen Artikel schreibt er über die schon seit Jahrzehnten sehr diskutierte Rentenpolitik. Er schreibt es so, als ob dies ein neues Thema wäre und als ob einige in der jetzigen Regierung überhaupt eine Idee hätten, was man dagegen machen könnte.


Hier zeige ich eine Grafik, die ich vor kurzem in einem anderen Post benutzt habe. Da können Sie sehen, wie der Anteil der Exporte, die mit Erdöl nichts zu tun haben, seit 1998 gesunken ist. Es ist nicht nur der Anteil, der gesunken ist: es werden immer weniger Dollars aus dem Ausland für nicht-erdölbezogene Waren oder Dienste verdient als vor 15 Jahren.



Export in Milliarden $: rot Erdöl und Nebenprodukte, blau: andere Exporte
Zelik sagt uns, dass der Minister Elías Jaua eine Lösung gefunden hat. Dabei handelt es sich um dieselben Projekte sein, die seit Ankunft des Militärscaudillos Chávez angekündigt waren. Anscheinend hat Herr Zelik die ganze Geschichte der letzten 14 Jahren verpasst, eine Geschichte verfehlter Projekte und zunehmender Korruption in einem sehr korrupten Land.

Für die Deutschen muss ich erklären, wer dieser Herr Elías Jaua ist: er ist der Minister, der sein Kindermädchen in einem staatlichen Flugzeug nach Brasilien fliegen lässt und zwar mit einem Koffer, wo ein Revolver liegt. Er ist der Mann, den Chávez als Gouverneur des Bundesstates Miranda haben wollte. Da die Leute ihn gar nicht wählten, da Capriles, einen oppositionellen Politiker, die Stelle gewann, hat die Nationalregierung das meiste Geld, das laut Verfassung der Regierung Mirandas gehörte, einfach zu einem Fonds umgeleitet, der von Jaua verwaltet wird - eine parallele Regierung, wie überall, wo die Opposition eine lokale Regierung gewinnen konnte. Wir werden hier das Thema nicht ansprechen, wie der Wahlrat immer die Nationalregierung begünstigt oder wie die Nationalregierung Staatsmittel - inklusiv Autos - benutzt, um mehr Stimmen zu kriegen. Auf jeden Fall ist das der Minister, der Ideen über einen neuen Weg hat. Dieser Minister aber sagt nichts anders, als was der Caudillo Chávez immer wieder sagte. Und das will Herr Zelig als Neues verkaufen.

Zeliks Position ist alles andere als neutral. Objektivität lässt sich nicht erkennen. Er sagt unter anderem, dass er in Caracas weniger Straßenarmut gesehen hat als in Berlin. Das ist schlicht und einfach Lug und Trug...es sei denn, seine Definition von Straßenarmut lautet "Obdachlose, die neben Kaufhäusern oder U-Bahnen schlafen". Wenn seine Definition so wäre, wäre die Lage in Caracas tatsächlich besser als in Berlin. Ist das aber alles, was er unter Straßenarmut versteht? Die Anzahl der  Menschen, die in heruntergekommenen Häusern in Venezuela wohnen ist riesig und die Lage hat sich seit 15 Jahren gar nicht verbessert. Wenn Herr Zelik sich die Mühe gegeben hätte, hätte er die Obdachlosen dem Guaire-Fluss entlang gesehen, die er sonst nicht sehen konnte. Er hätte sie auch in der Umgebung von Busbahnhöfen sehen können oder einfach in den vielen Slums, die Caracas hat. Und da ist die Lage nicht nur schlimmer als in Berlin, sondern mittlerweile als in Bogota.

Der Deutscher sagt, die U-Bahn wäre praktisch kostenlos. Er hat aber keine Idee über die tatsächlichen Kosten eines durchschnittlichen Venezolaners, der ausserhalb von Caracas den Nahverkehr - in Los Teques, in Charallave, in Valencia, in Maracaibo, in 90% vom Land benutzen will: die Kosten sind höher als in Deutschland.

Auch wenn die Statistiken der Vereinten Nationen mit Vorsicht zu genießen sind - schließlich kommen die meisten Angaben von den jeweiligen Ländern, gibt dieses Bild einen Eindruck über die Entwicklung der Armut in mehreren lateinamerikanischen Ländern wieder:
% der Bevölkerung unter Armut
Jetzt hat Venezuela einen höheren Anteil von Armen als Kolumbien. Das war vor 15 Jahren schlichtweg unvorstellbar und nein, ich bin kein Fan von Uribe oder Santos. Ich sage nur: zum Vergleich. Herr Zelik will oder kann solche Vergleiche nicht machen.
Wenn Herr Zelik schreibt, dass die Inflation in Venezuela nicht nur wegen einer verfehlten Wirtschaftspolitik rasant steigt, sondern weil mehr Menschen am Konsum teilhaben können, zeigt er, dass er wirklich nichts, aber auch nichts über Wirtschaftspolitik verstanden hat. Tatsächlich ist es so, dass der Konsum in vielen anderen Ländern Lateinamerikas genauso viel gestiegen ist, die Inflationsraten dort aber ein Bruchteil der Inflation Venezuelas ist.

Herr Zelik versteht wahrscheinlich nicht viel über Geldmenge. Hier habe ich eine Grafik, die zeigt, wie die Regierung Venezuelas seit 2003 Geld gedruckt hat. So was ist völlig verantwortungslos und kann nur von einer Regierung durchgeführt werden, die absolut kein Interesse an Entwicklung hat, sondern nur unbedingt Wahlen gewinnen wird und dann alle Macht eines Landes wahrhaben will.


Herr Zelig will nicht zugeben, dass die Korruption nicht einfach weiter lebt, sondern dass sie dramatisch zugenommen hat. Der Grund ist einfach: die Regierung hat, wie nie zuvor, mehr Kontrolle über alles. Die Gewaltenteilung ist praktisch aufgehoben. Will Herr Zelik das nicht glauben? Wahrscheinlich will er nicht, dass die deutschen Leser erfahren, dass die vorige Vorsitzende des venezolanischen Obergerichts unter Chávez öffentlich erklärte, dass die Gewaltenteilung den Staat schwäche. Die gegenwärtige Vorsitzende ist nicht besser: sie war eine Kandidatin der Chávez-Partei für die Stelle eines Gouverneurs gewesen.

Herr Zelik spricht über die 600000 Sozialwohnungen, die die Regierung in den letzten Jahren gebaut hat. Was er nicht sagt, ist dass selbst zu Zeiten von Caldera II, als die Erdölpreise niedriger standen als jetzt, mehr Sozialwohnungen gebaut und verteilt wurden. Sie waren oft besserer Qualität.

Herr Zelik sagt, die Opposition sei "rechte Opposition". Wahrscheinlich sind die Grünen und die SPD in den Augen Herrn Zeliks lauter "extrema derecha", wie Diosdado Cabello über die Opposition in Venezuela redet. Dass die meisten Parteien der Opposition in Venezuela eher Sozialdemokraten sind und Mitglieder der International Socialista sind, wird man in Deutschland durch Herrn Zelik nicht nicht erfahren.

Was Zelik auch nicht sagt: die Regierung Chávez hat zwar Latifundios von Menschen enteignet, die der Regierung nicht nahe standen. Sie hat aber die Latifundios anderer weiter geduldet. Viele der bolivarischen Bonzen - die Chávez-Familie, zB, aber auch die Familie des ehemaligen Ministers Torres oder  des ebenfalls ehemaligen Ministers Chacín - haben jetzt große Latifundios. Eine Landreform hat man nicht durchgeführt. Das ist bemerkenswert: selbst zu Zeiten von Rómulo Betancourt gab es einen Versuch von Agrarreform, wo zumindest einiges verteilt wurde.


Ein guter Auslandskorrespondent soll über mehr  viel mehr als Sprachkenntnisse haben. Wenn er (oder sie) über die Wirtschaftslage eines Landes berichten will, muss er in der Lage sein, Wirtschaftsexperten zu befragen, ihnen hinterherfragen. Ein Auslandskorrespondent muss in der Lage sein, mit graphischen Darstellungen über Produktion und Gesundheit, Kriminalitätsrate und Inflation umgehen zu können. Eigentlich lernt man das in der Schule - mit 12 oder 13 Jahren. Viele Menschen müssen danach Grafiken nicht weiter analysieren - zB wenn sie Anwalt oder Baseballspieler werden. Ein Journalist müsste aber ständig damit umgehen können.

Ein Auslandskorrespondent muss, solange er nicht nur über Fußball sprechen will, etwas über Wirtschaftspolitik wissen. Er muss verstehen, wie Inflation entsteht, was Geldpolitik und was Finanzpolitik ist. Dafür braucht er nicht Volkswirtschaftslehre oder Betriebswirtschaftslehre zu studieren. In Deutschland kann er eine der vielen Vorlesungen besuchen, die für Studenten aller Fachrichtungen bestimmt sind, um etwas über Wirtschaft zu lernen. Das habe ich selbst gemacht und mein Fachgebiet hatte mit Wirtschaft nichts zu tun. Es war nur Neugier. Soviel Neugier müsste ein Auslandskorrespondent haben. Wenn er aus irgendeinem Grund keine solche Vorlesungen besuchen konnte, kann er zumindest ein Buch zur Hand nehmen, das Laien die Welt der Wirtschaft erklärt...ein besten ein anderes Buch als Das Kapital (es spricht natürlich nichts dagegen, dass er auch so ein Buch liest.

Es ist Schade, dass öffentliche Medien in Deutschland Zellik zu Wort haben kommen lassen, ohne zuerst zu erklären, was für eine Ideologie dieser Mensch vertritt. Es ist Schade, dass Venezolaner unterschiedlicher Positionen in den deutschen Medien kaum eine Chance bekommen, um Venezuela zu erklären.


Sunday, 14 December 2014

Don't mess up with my Bolibourgeois! - and other crazy things from Venezuela

Bed bug, just like your favourite Chavista honcho

The Maduro government is organising a march for Monday 15 December in order to protest against the "economic sanctions from the USA against Venezuela". This means the government will get thousands of public employees to walk through the Caracas streets less they lose their jobs. To make the event more palatable, they say it is also "to celebrate the 15 years of the new constitution".

In reality there are no economic sanctions against Venezuela. The measures approved by the US Congress are aimed at very specific individuals within the top echelons of the current Venezuelan government - for their involvement in the violation of human rights. Whatever one's opinion might be about the double-standards of such measures, one has to admit they do not affect the lives of ordinary Venezuelans. And yet: Maduro wants to make Venezuelans believe that the hardships they are going through have something to do with the fact Diosdado Cabello, Elías Jaua and other honchos cannot use property in US territory or travel to the USA or the like. 

Venezuela's GDP is likely to shrink more tha 4% in 2014. Merentes, president of the Central Bank of Venezuela, had said last March the GDP would grow 4% this year.

Today Maduro also declared he doesn't break relations with the US because of "Chavista wisdom"...talking about oximorons. In reality he doesn't do it because his regime is so incredibly dependent on the US dollars for the dwindling oil exports Venezuela has.

This is curious: Maduro spent a lot of time today telling us how irreplaceable he is. He also announced the creation of a "general staff of economic war". It couldn't get more preposterous...or perhaps it can. After all, it's Venezuela.


To be continued...

Saturday, 25 October 2014

Venezuelas "Revolution" für Europäer erklärt


Am Freitag wurde das Kindermädchen, das die Kinder vom venezolanischen Minister der Kommunen und früheren Außenminister Elías Jaua betreut, im Sao-Paulo-Flughafen wegen illegaler Waffeneinfuhr festgenommen. Die Frau hatte in ihrem Koffer einen .38-Revolver und die entsprechenden Patronen. Sie war zusammen mit Jauas Schwiegermutter in einem Flugzeug der staatlichen Erdölgesellschaft PDVSA nach Brasilien geflogen und man hat die Waffe bei der Flughafenkontrolle ertappt.

Sehen Sie mal, wie Jaua in diesem Bild lächelt:


Ich bin sicher, dass dieser Mann jetzt nicht so breit grinst.

Seit 1999 - also seit der Ankunft der Chavistas- ist die Mordrate in Venezuela um über 300% gestiegen. Sie ist jetzt die höchste in Südamerika und wesentlich höher als in Mexiko. Nur Honduras und Guatemala scheinen in Lateinamerika eine etwas höhere Mordrate zu haben und beide sind kleinere Länder. Die Regierungen von Chávez und Maduro haben immer wieder neue Entwaffnungsprogramme angekündigt, die immer wieder in Vergessenheit geraten. Was kann man sonst erwarten, wenn die Bonzen und ihre Leute so mit Waffen umgehen?

Jaua lässt seine Familie in einem Flugzeug der staatlichen Erdölgesellschaft fliegen und wir erfahren davon, weil das Kindermädchen mit einer unangemeldeten Waffe ertappt wird. Was kann noch falsch sein? 

Wie ich anderswo kommentierte: wenn das das Kindermädchen war, will ich mir gar nicht vorstellen, was Jauas Tennislehrer so trägt.

Am Freitag hat Maduro den Innenminister Rodríguez Torres abgesetzt. Er setzte an seine Stelle Carmen Teresa Meléndez Rivas, die bis Freitag die Verteidigungsministerin war. Ihre Stelle wird wiederum von einem anderen Militär, von Vladimir Padrino López, übernommen. Man sagt, Maduro musste Rodríguez feuern, nachdem die Polizei unter seiner Kontrolle 5 Paramilitärs, unter anderem Odreman, tötete. Odreman war dem auch ermordeten PSUV-Abgeordneten Robert Serra sehr nah.

Also: die Paras entscheiden jetzt, wer der Innenminister ist.







Sunday, 3 August 2014

The FARC-supporting Colonel and Aruba: the Netherlands answers



Our friend Alpha placed a link with the answers to several questions the foreign minister of the Netherlands had to answer with regards to the Carvajal affair. It seems one of the opposition deputies in the Netherlands did ask the two questions I posted earlier. There are three pdf documents here (in Dutch). 
The Dutch are well-known for their role in Sebrenica. Here a picture of Dutchbat

Minister Frans Timmermans admits the Netherlands has declared Hugo Carvajal persona non grata but based on the article 23 paragraph IV of the Vienna Convention a government is not obliged to explain why it has declared someone persona non grata and it won't explain why in this case.

OK, Mr Timmermans, you don't want to tell us why you are declaring Hugo Carvajal persona non grata but we know why. We just wanted you to write to the world you won't explain it.

Now the Venezuelan opposition needs to spread the word in Venezuela: Hugo Carvajal has been declared persona non grata in the Netherlands and Venezuelans should investigate why exactly.

I will later comment on the rest but if you are impatient and you don't speak Dutch, you can simply copy and paste into a machine translation engine to get some approximation in English.

The documents don't really say much that is new. They just show the usual diplomatic wobbliness. One can read a little bit between the lines, that's it.

We Venezuelans should also ask the Netherlands how far it will go to collaborate with the current regime in Venezuela. From now on we will keep a much better eye on what the Netherlands is doing towards Venezuela. This regime won't last forever and the Netherlands should know what that means.

Friday, 1 August 2014

Questions to Frans Timmermans / Vragen aan Frans Frans Timmermans

I just read the questions to the Dutch minister of Foreign Affairs and his answers about the Carvajal affair. You can read that here (in Dutch). I am no deputy and I am not a Dutch citizen. I am a Venezuelan and a EU citizen. Still, I hope some Dutch journalist or politicians will manage to get the information from the Dutch government.


Mijnheer de minister Frans Timmermans

Als Venezolaan zou ik zo vrij willen zijn om U dit willen vragen:

1. Welke nieuwe informatie had u om van het eerdere standpunt af te wijken, om hierna de immuniteit van Hugo Carvajal te erkennen? (uw antwoord op vraag 3 kan dit niet uitleggen)

2. Wat is nu de reden om Hugo Carvajal ¨persona non grata¨ te verklaren in het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden? 

Met grote belangstelling zie ik Uw antwoord tegemoet.

In English:

Dear Minister Frans Timmermans
As Venezuela I want to ask you the following:

1. Which new data did you have that compelled you to change the initial position and recognise Hugo Carvajal's immunity? (your anwer to question 3 doe not tackle this point)

2. What was the reason now to declare Hugo Carvajal "persona non grata" in the Kingdom of the Netherlands? 

I look forward with interest to receiving your response.


This post will go with copy to the Dutch embassy in Venezuela, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to De Telegraaf and to several opposition deputies of the Netherlands and Venezuela.


Wednesday, 9 July 2014

The revolutionary oligarchy's infighting in Apure (updated)

Minister of Interior, who led the bloody attack to the Presidential Palace in 1992. His father wants to become the governor of Apure

News came in of a conflict between two Chavista groups in the Southwestern region of Apure, bordering with Colombia. A group of eight armed men went into the hacienda of 46-year old rancher Juan Carlos Rodríguez Torres and tried to kidnap the rancher. They didn't succeed because he was not there.

The first detail: Juan Carlos Rodríguez Torres is the brother of Miguel Rodríguez Torres, the current minister of Interior. Miguel Rodríguez Torres was one of Chávez's military pals. He was the one officer who commanded the bloody attack against the president's palace back in February 1992 during the coup led by Chávez.

Second detail: Juan Carlos also works as "political consultant" to his brother, the minister.

Third detail: Juan Carlos' hacienda has an area of five hundred hectares. That is not small for the brother of a socialist revolutionary. The place is located in the municipio Rómulo Gallegos of Apure.

Agents of the criminal police, under Miguel Rodríguez Torres' control, detained Oscar Montilla, member of a group called Frente Campesino Ezequiel Zamora. Montilla was accused of coordinating the attempted kidnapping. They accused him of commanding the men who tried to do the kidnapping. He was taken into custody to the alcaldía of Alto Apure and, according to deputy Zambrano, another Chavista, he was beaten up there. Alto Apure is a 10-year old entity, a sort of Über-municipality comprising the municipalities of Rómulo Gallegos and of Páez. It was created in 2004 by Chávez's suggestion. The mayor of Alto Apure is Jorge Rodríguez Galvis, Miguel Rodríguez Torres's father. Jorge wants to become the next governor of Apure.

Anyway: there is a conflict between the Rodríguez clan and the governor of Apure, Carrizález. The criminal police is, according to Montilla, trying to link him and Carrizález to the kidnapping. 

That's just the start. What do I expect? Carrizález's days as governor of Apure are counted.

Here you can read (in Spanish) a little bit more about how some local PSUV politicians critisize the Rodríguez clan.


Alto Apure, where the minister's father is the boss


Ps. Jorge Rodríguez Galvis had already been accused of not providing the required reports for the way he managed Alto Apure. The red judiciary system dismissed the case in 2009.

Monday, 7 July 2014

Venezuela's post versus the rest of the World

Venezuela's postal service has always have issues but since May of this year Venezuelans simply cannot send post to most of the rest of the world. Perhaps letters may arrive in Cuba, but I am not even sure of that. The system is so bad that even state employees, always afraid of losing their jobs, were protesting some weeks earlier.

When I was a child in Venezuela I used to get lots of post from people from the Soviet Union to Canada. A normal letter from Valencia, Venezuela, to Beliko Turnavo in Bulgaria or to Brno in Moravia would take at most two weeks to arrive.

In the last few years friends of mine have sent letters from Venezuela to Western Europe that took from three to six and a half months to arrive. Those letters spend at most two or three days of that duration in Europe. The rest of the time except for the flight they are in Venezuela. At the end of the XVIII century Venezuelan letters to Prussia would take less time than that. Only during the British blockade against Spain did letters take the time they were taking until this year, as Alexander von Humboldt once reported (a letter he sent from an Indian village in remote Apure arrived six months later in Prussia because of the English battle ships). Now Venezuelans can only use rather costly private services...even though the state employees keep getting their salaries.

What's the matter? The system is highly ineffective. People are not motivated to work. Prices don't change according to inflation. But the reason for the total collapse now is that the government doesn't have dollars to pay for getting letters out of Venezuela. This is yet another proof the government simply hasn't got the money.

Venezuela's postal services have become highly ideological spots. If you go to one of the few postal offices in Venezuela you will be shocked to see the level of personality cult and propaganda for Chavismo there.

Look at the twitter account of Spain's postal services:



And look at the twitter account of Ecuador's postal service:


This is the one for Venezuela: full of pictures of a military coup monger:


Venezuelan authorities say the "temporal suspension of international post" is due to a high demand. This is, of course, ludicrous.

Venezuelans now cannot send letters through the "revolutionary post service" but they still can buy these stamps and take part in the craziest, sickest personality cult of the last decades:



Thursday, 3 July 2014

Norway versus Venezuela, the Ministries

Norway and Venezuela have some things in common.

  • They both have oil and gas
  • They both have beautiful landscapes
  • They both have a minority of "First Nations" (Even if Sami and Native Americans had different interactions to the majority of the population, they also have many similar concerns)

Even so, as any visitor to both countries can tell you, these two countries couldn't be more apart. You can see wealth in Norway. It is, indeed a rich country. Venezuela is a poor country that insists it is rich because of its soil. Venezuela's population does not realise a country is only rich when the population has the productivity, the education and the organisation to use that soil or to generate wealth from other means, as Japan or Switzerland do. Norway's population reached many decades back levels of education - literacy and numeracy, for instance - that haven't been attained in Venezuela to this day.

The murder rate in Norway is about 1/60 of what Venezuela has now (1/19 of what Venezuela had in 1998). There are no shortages of electricity or other goods in Norway (unless you count the sun as a good). Tourism is well organised in Norway. In Venezuela tourist infrastructure is extremely bad.

Most importantly, Norway has a rule of law and separation of powers.

Here I try to compare bureaucracy in both countries. I try to compare ministries in Norway and in Venezuela. This is a hard task. Many things that a ministry does in one country are the tasks of other institutions in the other. In some case, there are ministries in Norway that do not exist in Venezuela but that is the case for a few only: Fisheries in Norway is something more or less carried out by 2) in Venezuela. The Ministry for Government Administration is something that is not quite available in Venezuela, although Planificación used to do a bit of that. The Ministry for Regions is not existent in Venezuela, although it is  something carried out by a couple of the 111 viceministries Venezuela has.

Chávez came to power promising to reduce the number of ministries. He increased them and no one dared to tell him what a liar he was. The number went from about 10 to 31. The number is now between 30 and 33 depending on how you count. Even ministers in Venezuela are not sure what is a ministry anymore.

Venezuelans have a ministry for Women, another for Youth and another one for the First Nations when those things are the matter of one ministry in Norway: the one for Children, Equality and Inclusion. Notice that Norwegians don't say "Ministry for Women" even if women in Venezuela and even many countries in Europe can envy the position women in Norway have.

Venezuela has a ministry for Sports even if it does so poorly in sports. Norway has that as part of the Ministry of Culture, but also of Health and Education.

Norway has a ministry of Education and Research, like Venezuela before Chavismo, but now Venezuela has a ministry for Education, one for University Education and another one for Research...even if research in Venezuela - very limited - has almost totally collapsed since the military and boligarchs are in power.

Venezuela under Chavismo has a ministry for Trade and a different one for Industries, even if industries have gone down the drain.

It also has a ministry for Tourism even if there are no decent public offices of tourism (the opposite of Norway and most other countries without such a ministry), a ministry for Housing even though the housing problem becomes worse and worse than it ever was, a ministry for Communication that is nothing but a Propaganda Ministry, a ministry for Communes and Social Protection, another one for Jails, one for the "Revolutionary Transformation of Caracas" and, last but not least, one for electricity.

My thanks go to S.H. for his input about Norway's bureaucracy. 


Office of Prime Minister  1) Despacho de la Presidencia y  Seguimiento de la Gestión del  Gobierno
Agriculture and food 2) Agricultura y tierras

3) Alimentacion
Fisheries and coastal affairs
Children, equality and inclusion 4) Mujeres, igualdad de género

5) Juventud

6) Pueblos indígenas
Culture 7) Cultura

8) Deporte
Defence 9) Defensa
Education and research 10) Educación universitaria

11) Educación

12) Ciencia, tecnología e innovación
Environment 13) Ambiente
Finance 14) Economía, finanzas y banca pública
Foreign affairs 15) Relaciones exteriores
Government administration, reform & church affairs $) Planificación
Local and regional government
Health and care services 16) Salud
Justice & police 17) Relaciones interiores, justicia y paz
Labour 18) Trabajo y seguridad social
Petroleum and energy 19) Petróleo y minería


Trade & industry 20) Comercio

21) Industrias
Transport and communications 22) Transporte terrestre

23) Transporte acuático y aéreo

24) Turismo

25) Vivienda y hábitat

26) Comunicación y la información

27) Comunas y protección social

28) Servicio penitenciario

29) Transformación Revolucionaria de la Gran Caracas
30) Electricidad


Here you see the GDP growth of both Norway and Venezuela across decades.

This year you will see the red line go under the zero level once more. Chavistas will say the cause is capitalism and the "Economic War". We know it is not. Norway's GDP will grow less than in previous year but Norway is not likely to enter into a major recession. Norway has always tried to develop policies for sustainable development. Venezuela is quite the opposite and this attitude has been at its worst since Chavismo is in power.

Wednesday, 2 July 2014

Nepotism in Venezuela (just a tiny tiny selection)


María Carmen Varela, sister of the minister for Penitentiary Affairs Iris Varela, is now the director of that ministry ("directora de despacho"). I wonder what job she had before this. 
There hasn't been so much nepotism in Venezuela probably since Tadeo Monagas

Ramírez Family

Engineer Rafael Ramírez is the director of the state oil company PDVSA and minister of Energy as well as economy czar now. His wife, Beatriz Sansó Rondón de Ramírez, is active at a legal company working for PDVSA. Hildegard Sansó, Beatriz's mother, is also a legal advisor of PDVSA. Her son, Baldó Sansó, is another advisor to PDVSA, one that Rory Carroll mentions in his book about Chávez. Diego Salazar Carreño, a contractor for PDVSA, is Rafael's godchild. Salazar comes from a family of ex guerrilleros. Eglis Ramírez, Rafael's uncle, was president of PDVSA Agrícola until 2012, when he was sacked. PDVSA Agrícola had received millions upon millions and had nothing to show for it.

Ameliach Family

Francisco Ameliach, the former coup monger and military who is now governor of Carabobo, has appointed his brother Saúl as "Sole Authority of Carabobo" (yes, that's the title). Saúl is also director of state company PEQUIVEN (oil).

Rangel Family

José Vicente Rangel, former vice-president and minister, now working as a "journalist", has a son, José Vicente Junior, working as vice-minister for Interior.

Chávez Family

The son-in-law of the late caudillo Chávez, Jorge Arreaza, is vice-president. Chávez's oldest brother is still governor of Barinas whereas Argenis Chávez, another brother, is supervisor of Venezuela's judges. Asdrubal Chávez, another one of the brothers, is vice-president of PDVSA.


Rodríguez Gómez Family

Jorge Jesús Rodríguez Gómez, mayor of Libertador, is the brother of Delcy Eloína Rodríguez, current minister of Communication.

Maduro and Flores Families

Now let's go with Maduro himself. Nicolás Maduro's 23-year old son is the Coordinator of the School of Cinema. He has no studies and no experience. He is already "head of body of inspectors". Nicolás Maduro's wife, Cilia Flores, is also deputy at the National Assembly. Now, one of her nephews, Carlos Erick Malpica Flores, is the treasurer of the Nation. Another one, Walter Gavidia Flores, is titular judge even though he is just 27 and the vast majority of judges in Venezuela work with a temporary contract. Hermes Flores, Numidia Flores, Cristian Flores, Demetrio Flores and Vladimir Flores were new employees of the National Assembly.

Cabello Family

Diosdado Cabello, former military coup monger, is the President of the National Assembly and one of the most poweful men in Venezuela. His wife, Marleny Contrera, was appointed to work at the SENIAT (tax agency). Marlene's brother  Ernesto was appointed as Manager Director at SENIAT. José David Cabello is not only a minister but also head of the SENIAT and his wife is "president of the SENIAT Foundation".

To be continued...

Wednesday, 25 June 2014

Чистка Единой социалистической партии Венесуэлы


Well, we saw how Maduro sacked 74-year old Giordani, the North-Korea admirer and CADIVI-creator. Giordani saw that coming, so he got a letter published on Aporrea, the semi-independent Chavista-base site. And the Boligarchs were not amused.

Miguel wrote a good post about Giordani's letter. Giordani is an old communist responsible for a lot of the very unsustainable, corruption-promoting policies of Maduro. Giordani just tried to justify his past - for the record and to bug those who sacked him after he held so much power-. Now that the government is running out of money in spite of the continuing oil boom, Maduro needs pragmatists. Maduro probably thought Giordani would go quietly and later accept some embassy, but Giordani decided to nag in public.

Former education minister Héctor Navarro, another civilian and very much a lefty, came up now and supported Giordani. And he has been expelled from the Politburo.

The funny thing: the one person in charge of coordinating "party discipline" within the Unified Socialist Party of Venezuela is Rodríguez Chacín, a military honcho friend of Chávez who was actually active during the hated IV Republic and was in the team of military that carried out the Massacre of El Amparo (Rodríguez was himself not present during the massacre but that was only because he had had an accident with the helicopter he was traveling in and was in a hospital when his comrades were shooting innocent fishermen). Rodríguez Chacín is also a big landowner who bought thousands of hectares of land around 2003, 4 years after Chavismo got into power.

In any case, in these days purges are not what they used to be. They are mild, they are more selective. They are just about removing people from power and/or money.


Saturday, 21 June 2014

Tod in Caracas und Erdölgeschäfte

Der venezolanischen Zeitung Notitarde zufolge war Cristophorus Wilhelm Klieuters, der Deutsche, der in Caracas kurz nach seiner Ankunft letzte Woche ermordet wurde, ein häufiger Besucher Venezuelas. Er war ein Geschäftsmann und hatte vor, mit mehreren Bonzen der staatlichen Erdölgesellschaft PDVSA zu sprechen. Klieuters hatte eine Firma, die mit Bohrinseln zu tun hatte, wie die Bild-Zeitung berichtet.

Kurioserweise heuerte er die Dienste einer privaten Sicherheitsfirma an, die einem aktiven General der berüchtigten venezolanischen Nationalgarde -Guardia Nacional- gehört. Wie kann um Gottes willen ein aktiver General so eine Firma treiben und das in einer sogenannten Revolution?

Hier könnt Ihr Dieterich auf Spanisch hören. Der Kerl, der sich als Ökonom bezeichnet, hat nichts verstanden. Er beschuldigt Maduro vieler Fehler, als ob Chávez damit nicht angefangen hätte. Er sagt, Maduro hätte nun inkompetente Minister, als ob die Minister des Caudillos Chávez andere Menschen gewesen wären.