The Venezuelans that betrayed the country. Chapter CCCMLXIV

Over twelve years ago I wrote in Spanish an article about a document that Russian dissident Bukovsky found when he finally had a one time access to the KGB archives. This documents shows how the president of the Venezuelan Communist Party back in the eighties, Faria, asked the KGB to train his nephew in sabotage and the usual stuff extreme leftists train into when they want to sabotage a government. This nephew, working at a Venezuelan university, was going to the Soviet Union in the framework of a scholarship but, as others, simply used that for ideological purposes. The documents showed the petition was approved. 

We do not know what happened afterwards but we know the extreme left used the opportunity in early 1989 to promote riots in Venezuela. Those riots were later known as El Caracazo. The military and the extreme left got into a lot of violence. The military was definitely responsible for many of the killings but the whole thing was murky to say the least. One of the military officials who went to fight against the extreme left was the brother of a military who later became one of Chavez's people. That man was killed. Even if he was fighting against the extreme left, this extreme left later considered him a victim of the right. Anyway, a myth became part of Venezuela's history that  up to 5500 people were murdered back then. The curious thing is that even if almost all Venezuelans over 16 year old had an ID at that time there was never a list of missing people that added more names to the 270 identified victims. Even if the relatives of those who died asked for an independent investigation, none was carried out. The most curious thing about those times was that those military who actually were responsible for crimes against the extreme left became later the representatives of that extreme left. Two examples were Roger Cordero Lara, shooting at unarmed leftists in the IV Republic and representing armed lefists in the V and Ramon Rodriguez Chacin, who was in the top military group hunting leftists and when the leftist came to power became minister and big landowner.

Anyway: the current ambassador of Venezuela to Russia is Carlos Faria, the son of that communist who asked a foreign intelligence service to train another relative in sabotage.

Russia and us

Putin's Palace

I recently read Catherine Belton's Putin's People. I can recommend the book about how the ruling class in today's Russia came to be and how it is interacting with the West. 

I do not agree with everything journalist Catherine Belton writes there. Still, I think she presents a huge amount of insights and hypothesis from which we can start many interesting discussions. Her statements should be considered in political circles in the EU, in Britain and in the rest of the West. 

Other specialists on Russia like Mark Galeotti have a different stance, they consider Putin's Russia is above all an adhocracy and they think the siloviki, the members of the security apparatus in Russia, are not that powerful and rather a bunch of improvisers. 

For me, the discussion whether Putin and his cronies came and remain in power as part of a master plan conceived by the  KGB  or whether the current situation is the result of a chain of trials and errors by some thuggish clan is less interesting than getting to know more details about what the siloviki have been up to in general.

Michael Kimmage wrote a rather negative review of Belton's book, which you can read it here. I bought the book after reading that review, I agree with some of Kimmage's points and yet I still found the book invaluable. Perhaps it is because I think most people can discern what is sheer speculation, what falls into the realm of cliches and what are actual facts or very probably facts. When I read a book that is on politics I do not expect to find a single idea explaining how some part of the universe came to be but get some pieces of concrete information and some possible explanations I can judge upon. 

You can watch some interviews with Belton in English here and here and in Russian here. I particularly liked the interview in Russian as the one doing the interview is taking the view of a Russian. You can read a more positive review on the book here and another one here by Princeton historian Stephen Kotkin. You can find many more on the Web on your own.

Some of the things I like, in no particular order:

1. there are references galore one can check out. Even if there are many anonymous sources and a lot of statements from individuals who are clearly biased against the ones in power in Russia now, there are also a lot of other sources one can delve into in order to judge by oneself
2. there is a lot of information about Igor Sechin, the Gazprom man.
3. Gazprom appearance and expansion is explained in full detail. Admittedly, there is too much of a Khodorkovsky perspective but again, I think any person who has been interested in Russia for some time can separate the wheat from the chaff here.
4. there are interesting pieces about the role of former Stasi members in the relationships between Europe and Russia. It is not only Matthias Warnig but Martin Schlaff and some others.
5. also some background on Nikolai Patrushev.
6. one can also read a lot of interesting information about the Beslan and Moscow Hostage crises

I liked less the final chapter, on how several characters linked to the Russian security services and how they were lobbying in the USA, in particular helping Trump to gain power. I do think Trump is more than compromised when it comes to Russia: many loans to his companies can be traced back to Russia, Trump's state of mind makes him love strongmen like Putin, he has repetedly show his man-love to Putin in a way that has been very embarrassing for the US intelligence agencies, to say the least. Still, the whole chapter seemed like a bit disconnected from the rest. One could have said there there are just as useful and often unconscious fools within the EU or Britain. Why a whole chapter for Trump? I am sure the current Russian government still would prefer for Trump to be re-elected but the last chapter should perhaps have been more general or have gone more into a discussion about what policies the West can develop.

As others mentioned, Belton gives a lot of credit to her contact Pugachev. She mentions a recording with his voice that was discovered after he left his house. I would be a bit careful about any recording, whatever its content.

As Kimmage wrote, Belton does not discuss much of the latest blunders the Russian regime has made. That is definitely a pity.

For those interested in what the siloviki are doing in Syria or Venezuela: you will find nothing of it in the book (there is only one single reference to the money Russia has loaned to Venezuela, for instance). Still, the book is very insightful and even more so for Venezuelans who want to have the big picture and who want to see where the Chavista regime is getting some of its ideas and support from. Igor Sechin, for instance, has big stakes in Venezuela and this book shows you a lot of where he is coming from. The money laundering parts are also very illuminating to understand how all these regimes work.

All in all, Belton's book is worth reading.

Are the Putinists weaker or stronger now in Venezuela?

A few months ago Putin changed his ambassador in Venezuela. The new one is the Armenian Russian Sergey Melik-Bagdasarov. The one before was Vladimir Zayemski (Wikipedia Spanish here).  Zayemski was an old school Brezhnev apparatchik. In fact, he started working as a "translator" at the Soviet embassy in Costa Rica back in 1974 and he became ambassador in the back then democratic Venezuela in 1976. He stayed there until 1979 and did the usual tour of a Soviet diplomat. He became again ambassador to Venezuela in 2006, while it was being transformed into a dictatorship with Cuban and Russian help. While Zayemski was a quiet albeit very loyal Putinist - remember Russia has never known the difference between State, government and ruling party - he was rather quiet and pretended to follow the rules. You would not see him on Twitter sending messages Trump-style. He would give some interviews to El Universal, a Venezuelan newspaper that became neutralized by the regime years ago, he would talk to Putin's largest organ abroad, RT, and he would give interviews to the Russian Kommersant. I have written about him earlier.

Parrot in a jail in Cuba

The current ambassador, Melik-Bagdasarov, keeps on tweeting in a rather chatty, clumsy way...but die-hard Chavistas follow him and parrot him.

Last year Russian journalists in exile published in English an article about why Putin is meddling in Venezuela so much. Things haven't changed: if Venezuela becomes democratic, Cuba's dictatorship falls and that would be a sign for a lot lot more.

Bear in mind: I will from now on try to differentiate more and more between Putinists and Russians. Not all Russians are Putinists and not all Putinists are Russians. It is true Russia has never known a democracy - unless we talk about Veliki Novgorod's times, but then that was a city-state -. But more and more Russians are starting to think their country deserves better.

Russia's hybrid war: a Norwegian perspective

I just finished a book by Norwegian journalist Øystein Bogen. The book came up last year, its Norwegian title, Russlands hemmelige krig mot Vesten, means "Russia's secret war against the West".  It is still only available in Norwegian but I  really hope it gets an English translation soon. It presents a comprehensive analysis of how Putin's Russia is carrying out disinformation campaigns, massive hacking and more aggressive attacks in the West. I have read a lot of things about Russia since I was a child and I always keep an eye for those things but I learnt a lot, even in cases I thought I had read enough already.

Bogen presents a short but very solid historical background of how the Soviet Union was carrying out its desinformation wars in the West. Osten goes into interesting details about how USSR did this. For instance, the KGB worked with obscure newspapers in India to start writing AIDS was "in reality a biological weapon that came from US labs". This lie ended up spreading to Africa and then to the whole world. The Soviet Union also worked with sympathizers in the West, something its follower, Russia of Putin, keeps on doing through obscure think tanks and politicians of both the extreme right and extreme left.

Here a few of the topics covered in this book:

• How the propaganda machines RT and Sputnik work

• How the Russian intelligence services carried out the attack on Estonia in 2007, what came up before and afterwards there (among many things, what happened to Eston Kohver)

• How the invasion of Crimea and the Donbass war were prepared and how Russia carries out a propaganda war against Ukraine

• How the Russian intelligence services tried to influence things in Montenegro

• How the extreme right and the extreme left in Europe are used to destabilize the West

• How the Russian campaign for Trump and against Clinton was carried out and what precedents there were in the USA
• How Russia used the migration crisis in Europe to destabilize the West (an example that comes up is the way it let thousands of refugees go all the way across Russia to Northern Norway and Finland)

There is also a chapter with the general references to the Litvinenko case but also to many other murders (briefly mentioned on BBC here). There were details I was not aware of like how Henry Kissinger became a lobbyist for Putin.

And there are a couple of chapters on how Russia is meddling in Norway, Sweden and Finland. The only thing that might be a challenge for most English readers in this book is that there are a couple of chapters mostly dealing with Russia's attacks in Scandinavia and no Scandinavian readers might lose focus when things are not so much about themselves.

Bogen presents both sides of the story - or more as there are often more than two - and also his own account and analysis. He has been there and up there. He offers a wealth of sources.The book is very well documented, with sources from the Russian side and from every Western country mentioned.

Those who have read my blog for some time know I have followed Russian events for many years. I can tell you: Osten knows what he writes about. You might want to check out Mr Bogen's appearances in English online. Those of you who read Norwegian should try to check out his books if you have not done so before (most Norwegians will know he works at TV2).

Los rusos interviniendo con poco dinero

Los venezolanos debemos estar muy pendientes sobre lo que quiere hacer el régimen ruso actual en Venezuela. Los rusos tienen Novichok, tienen sus agentes, tienen su órgano propagandístico RT, sus bots. Tienen sus armas. Aun así, no podrán impedir que nuestro país organiyce elecciones libres, limpias y que volvamos a la democracia y a un camino de desarrollo disponible. Pero si queremos que este cambio ocurra lo más pronto posible, debemos entender a ese país del este.

PIB per capita de algunos países (Banco Mundial)

Como pueden ver en el gráfico anterior, el producto interno bruto per capita de los rusos es muy inferior al de Italia - el PIB total de Italia, evidentemente, es superior al ruso pese a que Italia tiene muchas menos personas y menos recursos naturales). También pueden ver allí cómo otros países otrora bajo el control soviético -y por consiguiente ruso- han sobrepasado a Rusia: es el caso de Polonia, es el caso de los tres países bálticos Lituania, Latvia y ante todo Estonia. Solo Ucrania (no está en este gráfico) aun tiene un PIB per cápita inferior al ruso, pero eso en gran parte se debe a la guerra que Rusia mantiene en la frontera oriental de Ucrania.

Pese a que Rusia per cápita tiene una productividad bastante modesta para los países desarrollados, sigue queriendo intervenir en el mundo de manera muy agresiva. Las razones de esto son complejas:

• reacción a la expansión de la OTAN, 
• reacción a las sanciones de Occidente por el Anschluss ruso de Crimea, 
• esta expansión posibilita a Rusia vender más de sus principales productos: armas.
• métodos de ganar dinero de muchos de los oligarcas, muchos de los cuales están conectados al servicio secreto ruso y al aparato militar

El gobierno ruso cree que si mantiene las manos de Occidente ocupadas con un montón de regiones en crisis, desde Venezuela hasta Siria, puede ganar espacio en la competencia internacional.

Pueden ver algunos artículos en español sobre cómo los rusos procuran ganar influencia en África.

El actual embajador ruso en Venezuela es un viejo diplomático que ya trabajaba en la misma embajada hace cuarenta años, en tiempos de la nacionalización y la mayor prosperidad de nuestro país. Él sabe muy bien cómo el país ha degenerado pero sus intereses son los intereses del gobierno ruso. El gobierno ruso quiere arriesgar mucho.

En mi opinión la mejor manera de interactuar con los rusos es informar, informar muy bien al mundo entero de las intenciones rusas, del nivel de ataques a los derechos humanos en Venezuela, del horrible nivel de corrupción en Venezuela, de cómo Venezuela se ha estado hundiendo mientras casi toda América Latina va avanzando...y en declarar a los rusos que si quieren ver los miles de millones que han gastado en Venezuela su mejor apuesta es apoyar el regreso a la democracia.

No olvidaremos lo que hagan los rusos, sea lo que hagan de mala o de buena fe.

La economía rusa en los próximos años enfrenta grandes desafíos. Es mejor que se ocupen de arreglar su país que de apoyar una dictadura atroz en Venezuela.

Where is Maduro going to go?

First of all: we need to be cautious. Maduro is going to cling to power a little bit more. This is not 1989 Eastern Europe. Venezuela is not Czechoslovakia, Putin is not Gorbachev who cared about human rights and stuff but rather an ex KGB who feels humiliated by the West and China's GDP is more than 20 times what it was back then and it is a country looking for good colonies. There are lots of people around Maduro who are not only guilty of crimes against humanity but also a lot who are actually involved in drug trafficking and other stuff that might have repercussions even if the new government puts in place a very generous amnesty law. Big Chavistas know they might not have such a quiet life as their counterparts in Eastern Europe back in the nineties because they have made enemies everywhere.

Yanukovich lives close to Moscow but he speaks Russian better than Maduro, Cabello or Flores

Let's see Maduro's options very soon:

1) Staying in Venezuela as a normal citizen: this would mean he would need to have lots of security guards around him all the time and yet he won't be able  to move much: even if no one would touch him, he would be booed everywhere he went all the time, at the very least.

2) Going to Cuba: a lot of people take this as the more likely option but they forget Cuba's regime is largely counting on Venezuela's blood to survive. When Chavismo falls - and it will fall - Castristas will have other concerns. They definitely do not want Maduro there.

3) Going to Mexico: this might be an option if Maduro decides to go to some hacienda in some remote area of Mexico and the current president, lefty Obrador, gives him also protection round the clock.

4) Going to some country in Western Europe: this is possible but probably less so than option 3. First of all: Maduro and his people would not be able to keep up with their lifestyle without getting noticed and Venezuelan expats would make his life difficult: Cilia Flores would not be able to go shopping just lik that in the streets of Zurich or Paris. There are too many Venezuelans there and we live in the Age of the Mobile.

5) Going to Russia: this seems like an option as there are fewer Venezuelans there, Putin still has control of the country even if his popularity is going down. Still, I still cannot picture him spending his days in Moscow or Saint Petersburg, surrounded by mostly Russian speaking people. 

6) The same goes for Belarus but much more so than Russia.

We need to try to picture all this so that we can understand Maduro´s state of mind. Take into account that this is also in the minds of dozens and dozens of other Chavistas. 

I am currently not saying anything more. He has to go. Democracy must finally arrive to Venezuela as it arrived to the Czech Republic, to Estonia, to Eastern Germany. We need to show Maduro that if he tries to stay in Venezuela even though nobody wants him is going to be for him much worse than options 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 or 10000.

At this moment I think Maduro's best options are Mexico or Russia.

El embajador de tiempos soviéticos en Venezuela del siglo XXI

Vladímir Fiódorovich Zayemski es el embajador de Rusia en Venezuela desde hace tiempo. Tiene 66 años. Hace unos días un periodista del períodico de asuntos comerciales Kommersant lo entrevistó sobre el tema de Venezuela y el hombre regurgitó la típica propaganda putinista. Pueden ver la entrevista en ruso aquí.

Este era Brezhnev, no el embajador actual de Rusia en Venezuela, pero hay que tener en cuenta que el embajador ya trabajaba en el servicio diplomático soviético en esos tiempos

Entre otras cosas, dio la usual interpretación putinista-chavista de la Constitución de Venezuela y sobre las condiciones según las que Guaidó asumió la presidencia de nuestro país. 

Dijo, en buen estilo soviético, que muchos medios de comunicación no habían mencionado que aparte de los miles de opositores que marcharon el 23 de enero también hubo "marchas masivas en apoyo de Nicolás Maduro en Caracas y otros sitios". Todos los que vivimos o tenemos familiares y amigos en Venezuela sabemos que eso es una vil mentira.

Zayemski aseguró al periodista que las inversiones rusas no corren peligro (es algo que se menciona con frecuencia en la prensa rusa, no las violaciones a los derechos humanos en nuestro país). Dijo que se seguía en la cooperación "en el campo petrolero, de armamento, agropecuario". También dijo que en el país vivían actualmente unos 800 rusos. 

Uno tendría que preguntarse qué hacen tantos rusos allí.

La mayoría de la información que hay sobre él está en ruso. Si visitan su página de Wikipedia leerán, entre otras cosas lo siguiente:

• estudió en el Instituto Estatal de Relaciones Exteriores de Rusia en tiempos de Brezhnev
• fue empleado de la embajada de la Unión Soviética entre 1976 y 1979, en tiempos de CAP I y cuando aun mandaba Brezhnev en su país
• fue empleado del departamento para asuntos de América Latina del Ministerio de relaciones exteriores de la URSS
•  fue segundo secretario de la embajada soviética en México (81-86)
• fue primer secretario en el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores,
• estuvo luego en EUA para encargarse de asuntos latinoamericanos y de la OEA
• fue mano derecha del ministro de relaciones exteriores Ivanov del 94 al 96
• Del 96 al 98 encabezó el departamento de Asuntos Internacionales del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (sinceramente no sé qué hacen esos, parece un ministerio dentro de otro)
• Del 98 al 2002 estuvo en la representación rusa en Nueva York para Naciones Unidas
• Del 2002 al 2004 fue director del Departamento para América del Norte en el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Rusia
• Del 2004 al 2009 director del Departamento de Asuntos Internacionales en el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores
• y a partir de 2009 ha sido embajador de Putin en Venezuela, Haití y República Dominicana.

Hace años escribí ya sobre cómo los soviéticos entrenaban a los miembros del Partido Comunista venezolano, entre ellos de la familia chavista Faría, en métodos de terrorismo.

How Communism took hold of society, lessons for Venezuela

Stalin and Beria...no, they were not a reversal of what Lenin wanted...Lenin enabled them and was as unethical as they were

If you speak English, you should really watch these two videos, particularly the second halves of both of them. Robert Service is one of my favourite historians and he is on both videos but the first one also has several others with very interesting, complementary views.

From Tsars and Lenin to Putin and Trump
100th Anniversary of the Russian Revolution

History does not repeat itself, we know...and yet we can recognise some patterns and see how to try to prevent some of them.

Los rusos en Venezuela un día antes del teatro (corregido)

Nota: escribí con prisa este post un día antes de las elecciones y escribí "petróleo" cuando debí haber escrito "gasolina".


Hace poco el periódico ruso Kommersant entrevistó al embajador ruso en Venezuela, Vladimir Zayemski. Según Wikipedia rusa, este hombre nació en 1952 y se graduó en el Instituto Estatal de Estudios Internacionales en 1974, comenzó a trabajar para la embaja soviética en Costa Rica en 1974 y fue traductor de la embajada soviética en Caracas del 1976 al 1979. Ha sido embajador de Rusia en Venezuela desde 2009.

de Wikipedia

Como era de esperar, el hombre de Putin dijo que la actitud América Latina y a Unión Europea de

rechazar el evento de este domingo 20 era poco seria porque "no se puede juzgar desde lejos".

Para él hay que ve las cosas - vaya ironía - con los ojos y consultar a participantes inmediatos

del teatro político (sus palabras). Citó a Luis Emilio Rondón, "el único que representa los intereses de la oposición". Este habría declarado que las condiciones de las elecciones del domingo serían prácticamente iguales a las de diciembre de 2015, cuando la oposición ganó en las elecciones de la Asamblea Nacional. Rondón también habría dicho que se realizaron todos los protocolos y auditorías necesarias. Algo que la oposición debería saber: este jurista, según Kommersant, presenció junto a los otros jefes del CNE el pasado jueves la firma de un acuerdo de cooperación con el Consejo Electoral Ruso.

Según el embajador, Rondón le agradeció a él que Rusia aceptase el hecho de que los asuntos de Venezuela deben ser resueltos por los venezolanos. ¡Vaya cosa curiosa! Esto me parece parecido a lo que el nuevo jefe de Estado de Armenia le dijo a Putin al llegar al poder hace poco.

Zayemski repitió, como Labrov en Siria, que debe haber diálogo. Cuando el periodista le preguntó porqué este ha fallado, Zayemski mencionó que por casualidad (!!!!) estaba en Santo Domingo cuando se iba (según él) a firmar el acuerdo con la oposición del 7 al 9 de febrero. El embajador causalmente estaba en el mismo hotel donde se hallaban oficialistas y opositores y habló con funcionarios dominicanos. Según estos (y según él), los opositores habrían vuelto de Caracas con nuevas exigencias que no habían sido tocadas antes y esto fue una sorpresa para todos. Según el embajador, hay grupos en Miami y en general de EUA que se oponen a un diálogo y Maduro debe proponer uno nuevo.

El embajador ruso cree que la oposición quería provocar una revolución de colores pero que fracasó po dos motivos: las protestas, donde se bloqueaba el paso de médicos y ambulancias a los enfermos y de los niños a las escuelas, terminaron molestando a la población en general y en particular a la clase media y además, los radicales querían derramar sangre.

Zayemski calificó también de gran error y violación a la constitución el que la oposición hubiese aceptado que una parte de la Corte Suprema - 12 de 30 miembros - decidiese desde Colombia enjuiciar a Maduro. El embajador no parece darse cuenta de que el régimen chavista ha violado cada uno y todos los artículos de la constitución una y otra vez.

El embajador finalmente mencionó que Rusia puede cooperar con Venezuela no solo en el petróleo y en la promoción de la agricultura (ya vemos cuánto éxito no han tenido) sino también en la explotación de bauxita, niobio, hierro, tántalo, etc.

Algo interesante llegó al final: al parecer Zayemski ha incitado al gobierno de Maduro a aumentar e precio de la gasolina, algo que este no quiere hacer.

Según él, sin embargo, los medios extranjeros exageran la situación en Venezuela. Para ello citó estadísticas de Naciones Unidas según las que en 2017 "solo" un uno por cierto de la población participó en las protestas. El embajador de Putin al parecer no se ha dado cuenta, pese a vivir en Caracas, que casi una décima de la población de mi país ha huído en los últimos 3 años.

Un venezolano sobre Rusia y sus medios (I)

Me he interesado en Rusia desde que era un chico. Mi interés tiene un origen cultural: me fascina la literatura clásica rusa, me encanta el idioma ruso y me ha parecido muy interesante aprender sobre una región tan diferente de Venezuela, mi país. Al contrario que la gran mayoría de los venezolanos que se interesó por Rusia a partir de los ochenta, jamás tuve simpatías por los sistemas políticos que han prevalecido allí.

Tengo amigos rusos. Estos viven en Rusia y fuera de ella. He ido al país y he tratado de entenderlo en la medida de lo posible. 

Hoy leo con interés y tristeza pero sin un atisbo de sorpresa un artículo de la ONG Levada. El artículo haba sobre dónde en los rusos sus noticias.

Levada, como muchas otras ONGs, está en la mira de las autoridades rusas, que obligan ahora a todas las organizaciones que puedan ser críticas de una u otra forma al gobierno actual a declararse "agentes extranjeros". Esto es casi como declararse espías-mercenarios de los extranjeros.

La organización realizó una serie de encuestas hace unos meses y preguntó a los rusos de ciudad y pueblo qué noticias veían en la tele.

La gran mayoría sigue las noticias de tele del Primer Canal, de Rossija 1 y de NTV Ruso. Un dos por cien de los rusos ve las noticias del canal Dozhd', que presenta algo de críticas. Un 5% ve Euronews en ruso...noticias ligeras de la UE. Un 1% ve BBC en ruso. Un diez por cien no ve tele. Algo que uno tiene que tomar en cuenta: el gobierno de Putin le ha hecho la guerra a Dozhd' desde hace tiempo. Muchos proveedores de televisión por cable lo retiraron de su oferta y ahora este canal es visto ante todo por Internet si se paga. En cualquier país pocas personas van a pagar por el derecho a ver un canal a menos que ya tenga un deseo muy grande de verlo. 

Tengamos en cuenta algo: pese a toda la autocracia que impera en Rusia, ese país está siendo gerenciado de una manera muchísimo mejor de lo que está siendo gerenciada Venezuela. Los rusos aun (aun) pueden surfear con bastante libertad en la red y ver esos canales como Dozhd', al menos si viven en la ciudad o tienen buena conexión de Internet. También pueden comprar un diario crítico como Novaja Gazeta, aunque este cueste el doble de lo que cueste un Izvestia. Pueden comprar los libros de Svetlana Aleksiévich, al menos si viven en una de las grandes ciudades o lo encargan en ozon.

Si hay algo que me ha llemado la atención en los últimos tiempos es la división entre mis conocidos en Rusia y los que están fuera: los que están en la Federación Rusa básicamente tienen muy poco interés en las noticias de política o son putinistas. Los que están fuera se interesan mucho más en seguir el acontecer político en Rusia y fuera, pero también tienden a ser más críticos del sistema que tiene su país de origen.

Cubans and Russians and the military in Venezuela

If there are two things I still find missing in the reports about Venezuela under the Chavista dictatoship are 1) the role that both Cuban and Russian secret services are playing in the land of Grace and 2) the way Maduro, like his predecessor, the caudillo Chavez, is trying to make the military take over the economy of Venezuela in the same way as it is done in Cuba. 

Let's face it: the day Venezuela's regime falls is the moment when the Cuban dictatorship starts to crumble as well. The moment Venezuela's regime falls is the time when Russians lose almost all of their clout in the American continent.

It is time for us to make these relations as transparent as possible, to discuss them publicly in Venezuela, to challenge time after time the role of these powers.

SEBIN, Chavista "intelligence" service: just a tool for narco generals and foreign powers

Here you can read an interesting article about how the average Cuban sees Venezuela. As for the average Russian, I can tell you: he is as badly informed. I will write a bit more about that in my next post.

Comeremos Kalashnikov y los rusos manejarán toda nuestra información

El vicepresidente de Rusia y ante todo jefe de la industria militar, Dmitri Rogozin, declaró al diario ruso Kommersant que la fábrica de Kalashnikovs AK-103 en Venezuela, que tanto se había demorado, estará lista para 2019: las máquinas rusas están preparadas, todo está vigilado (sí, vigilado). Lo único que falta es que los venezolanos terminen de construir el edificio. Ya los rusos han elegido cuál será el contructor venezolano. Estas declaraciones se produjern en un encuentro con  Delcy Rodríguez, la ministra chavista para relaciones exteriores, hermana de Jorge Rodríguez, el comunista que controló el Consejo Nacional Electoral por tanto tiempo.

Rogozin también mencionó que Rusia terminará la construcción de dos centros para helicópteros rusos en Venezuela. Uno servirá para el entrenamiento de pilotos y el otro para el mantenimiento. Supongo que con esto tratarán de que no se caigan tantos.

Ahora viene lo mejor: el hombre declaró que Rusia está dispuesta a proporcionar chips para tarjetas bancarias y tarjetas de SIM y para colaborar "en la programación para la defensa contra ciberataques". Repitió la versión del chavismo: los bancos venezuela habrían sido víctimas hace poco de un ataque de hackers y - esto lo dice en primera persona del plural- "lo enfrentamos y vencimos". Por supuesto que esos supuestos ataques solo son una explicación chavista para ocultar que la infraestructura no sirve...y no sirve, entre otras cosas, porque en Venezuela nadie tiene idea de qué cuesta producir algo.

Ahora Rusia está "ofreciendo apoyo informático". Ya sabemos a dónde va a parar eso del software y programadores de Rusia.

Un par de detalles sobre este hombre: hace un tiempo declaró que la venta de Alaska a Estados Unidos no fue realizada de manera limpia y que Rusia tiene derecho a reclamar ese territorio. Rogozin también ha estado permanentemente involucrado en "ayudas" a Transnitria, un satélite ruso en la dividida Moldavia.

Otra de las cositas que dijo: que querría conducir de casa a su trabajo en un tanque GAZ-2975 Tigr para promover la industria rusa. Rogozin es uno de los hombres de Putin que no tiene permitido entrar en Estados Unidos o la Unión Europea. Algunas de las acciones o declaraciones de Rogozin serían clasificadas en un país normal como ultranacionalistas o sencillamente racistas.

Venezuela, Rusia, armas y más corrupción

Lenta informa sobre el juicio en Moscú al ex-senador ruso Sergey Popelnyujovym por fraude en el proyecto de la fábrica de kalashnikovs en Venezuela.

El caudillo Chávez había  firmado un contrato con los rusos en 2001 para que se construyera una fábrica de kalashnikovs en Venezuela que produjera unas 25000 armas anualmente. Popelnyujovym tenía amigos en la empresa estatal Rosoboronexport, de la que he escrito anteriormente, y consiguió a través de estos una participación en el proyecto.

Popelnyojovym, dicen ingenieros, trabajadores y contratistas, no les pagó durante meses. Estos trataron de reclamar las deudas, pero este los evitó. Al parecer, el diario Lenta escribió a la embajada rusa en Caracas y tampoco recibió respuesta de lo que pasaba. Los ingenieros finalmente se dirigieron al gobierno ruso. En 2015 miembros de Rosoboronexport decían que la culpa de los retrasos era de los venezolanos.

Finalmente, el juzgado de Tver detuvo a Popelnyujovin el 4 de junio de 2015. Desde aquel entonces este ha mantenido que la culpa de los retrasos es de los venezolanos y de Rosoboronexport y que se ha logrado construir casi toda la fábrica.

Entre los elementos que se discuten en el juicio es el papel de CAVIM, que habría recibido mil millones de rublos o más de 16 millones de euros en aquel entonces.

Pueden encontrar algo en castellano sobre este asunto aquí (de 2015) y aquí (marzo de 2016).

Sería interesante si la oposición venezolana distribuyese volantes a las personas que hacen filas para comprar comida con preguntas sobre el papel de CAVIM y de los militares en general en todos estos negocios.

Sería también interesante si nuestros diputados exigen de manera pública a los militares chavistas que expliquen qué es lo que está pasando en ese juicio y qué hay de las aseveraciones de Rosoboronexport y de Popelnyujovin.

Mientras este juicio prosigue y el hambre aumenta en Venezuela, el régimen chavista planifica nuevas compras de armas. Lenta cita al experto de armas Frolov, quien dice que pronto Venezuela comprará al menos una decena de Sujoy 30MK.

Russian interests in Venezuela

It is funny that today, of all days, Russian newspaper Kommersant decided to publish a little article about Russian economic interests in Venezuela.

I wonder if the parents of those kids voted now for the opposition

They say Venezuela takes position 5 when it comes to Russian weapons (6% of all sales). My country spent $3.2b only in 2012-2015 (much more between 2004 and 2012 - my comment-). There are outstanding credits for around $6 billion.

Where did my underdeveloped country spend the money? It went for 30 Sukhoi, 34 helicopters Mi-17V-5, 10 helicopters Mi-35M, 3 Mi-26T, 3 Mi-172 and 2 Mi-172VIP, defence systems PVO TOr-M1 and Pechora-2M, 100000 Kalashnikovs, PZRK Igla, 92 tanks T-72 and some other similar soldiers' toys.

There is now  a company for producing AK-103 called CEMAREH. Those are the AKs you will see in the next robberies in Venezuela.

The Russians also have 40% of Petromiranda. There is a bank created in 2009. There are a few other projects as well - just go to the page and if you don't speak Russian, use machine translation or ask your nearest Russian friend- and last but definitely least, there is the Empresa Mita Ruso-Venezolana Orquídea S.A. to sell orchids in Moscow. I wonder if Miguel likes that one. Perhaps not.

From Russia without love

Venezuela is one of Russia's most important clients for its weapons export. The South American country has spent over 9 billion dollars in Russian arms since 2006. Venezuela's government has even used a lot of money from the FONDEN, the "Fund for Endogenous Development", in order to pay for those arms. Chávez saw to it that the National Parliament cannot do anything to control the use of that money.

Some might think lots of Russians feel like buddies with Venezuelans. That is not the case. If you read the recent polls published by the Levada Centre, you will see Venezuela is far away in most Russian minds. When asked what countries they could name as close friends of Russia, people named Belarus, China, Kazakhstan, Armenia, India, Cuba (yes, still Cuba), Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Tajikistan, Moldavia, Uzbekistan, Kirghistan, Serbia and only then Venezuela. Venezuela is now just slightly "closer" to Russia than Germany and Turkey. The best popularity Venezuela got was in 2009 and it has been dropping off the radar for Russia since then. It only surpassed Germany this year because of the Ukraine crisis. Let's be honest: Venezuela is indeed very far away from Russia and other than oil and arms dealers a a bunch of Latin American fans with lots of adventure will, few Russians have anything to do with Venezuela and most Venezuelans who ever had anything to do with Russia were communists, a tiny group of Russian expats - but then Venezuela had expats from all over the world - and a couple of others with exotic or weird cultural interests like me.

Venezuela is one of the few countries that has followed Putin's will to recognise Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia as independent nations. The ambassador of Venezuela to Russia also deals with the non-existent relations to Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia.

Two weeks earlier several Venezuelan honchos went to Russia to ask for more money and cooperation. Here you can read about how mogul Rafael Ramírez signed on 24 May 2014 a deal with ex-KGB man Igor Sechin to get 2 billion dollars in advance in return for over 1.6 million tonnes of oil and 7.5 million tonnes of oil products within five years. Venezuela's government was one of the few governments that supported at United Nations Russia's move on Ukraine on 27 May 2014. The other only countries were North Korea, Belarus, Cuba, Zimbabwe, Syria, Bolivia, Sudan, Nicaragua and Armenia.

Venezuela is having to pay dearly for Russia's loans and weapons - as well as some SIGINT-. It's not precisely love or will for honest cooperation that binds both countries together.

Venezuela's rulers are doing this even if oil prices are still at a record high. For those of you who do not follow the development of oil prices, here a perspective:

Russians, oil and Venezuela

Gazprom has decided to give back the license for oil exploration in the Urumaco II area. They are backpedaling from oil projects in Cuba and Ecuadorean Guinea as well. Gazprom apparently spent about 300 million dollars in exploration work in Venezuela and the Devil's Excrement didn't pop up as expected. The Urumaco II block is part of the Rafael Urdaneta project (Rafal Urdaneta's the name of an old military, what else?) in the Gulf of Venezuela. You can read about that here (in Russian). This announcement, from documents about their decisions from 2013, shouldn't be a surprise. Gazprom had already said a long time ago they were abandoning that field.

The statements about Gazprom's losses, by the way, came last year from Igor Sechin, former Portuguese interpreter for the Soviet forces in Africa and KGB man, one of Putin's best friends and one of the men who was recently placed on a US list of sanctions for Russia's actions in Ukraine. Sechin is Rosneft's chef, not Gazprom's boss but he had explained those things in his capacity as vice-president of Russia. You can read some about the relationship between these companies in the Economist. Bloomberg offers a detailed portray of Rosneft's role in Russia today and quite some insight into Sechin's mind.

Oil prices have been rather stable for the last 3 years at a level 800% higher than in 1998. That is bad for a country that has become so dependent on oil that it needs ever higher oil prices to grow.

No El Dorado

Russia can share Venezuelan oil with China

The Russian newspaper Kommersant tells us how Lukoil is trying to sell its shares in the oil field of Junin. Lukoi is talking to the French Total, the Norwegian Statoil, the Korean KNOC, the Indian ONGC, the US American Chevron, the Russian Zarubezhneft and Bashneft and to the Chinese Sinopec and CNOOC.

Talking about Chávez having nationalised oil exploitation: officialdom told useful idiots abroad Chávez had nationalised the oil industry, which he definitely did NOT. What he did was to cancel the agreements the Venezuelan state had signed when oil prices were at the bottom. These agreements had been necessary so that Venezuela could have even some basic research going on. Chávez did that only after oil prices rose high enough for him to get financial respite. In the last few years oil prices kept increasing but even they are not enough to keep up with the research and maintenance costs of the oil industry, so the government has had to open up again and has done so getting into deals that are probably worse than anything the maligned Carlos Andrés Pérez did. In that context, the Chávez government has introduced a series of oil projects whereby foreign companies can get up to 40% of shares. In the case of Junin,  60% of that 40% went to Rosneft, led by notorious Igor Sechin, and 20% went to Lukoil and Gazprom Neft each. 

Lukoil has had problems negotiating with Gazprom and also with Rosneft, so it is trying to leave. According to the consortium laws, the companies have to decide by the end of this month - i.e. by tomorrow, what is going to happen with the shares. Sechin didn't want to give the money Lukoi expected for its 20%. Some say the Chinese are going to be the ones carrying out the deal and that Rosneft and Gazprom would agree to that.

Venezuelan companies investing in Venezuela? Not with the "revolution". 

Are the Chinese going to get yet more of our oil fields, from the Russian, that is?

From Russia with bigotry and racism

First edition of a very notorious publication

I was looking for some more news about Venezuela and Russia when I stumbled upon this article at a recent Internet magazine called Zvgljad.

There, Vladimir Travkin, a guy who is supposed to be a political scientist gave his view of Venezuela last March, shortly before the caudillo and former coup monger Chávez died.

When asked about the chances Capriles had, Travkin said:

"Capriles will do everything to get a rematch after his defeat in the [previous] presidential elections. But he has special treats that we cannot ignore: firstly, he is a Jew and secondly, he is gay. This might reflect negatively on his electoral chances. I don't think there is such a political correctness in Venezuela...in this confrontation there is on one side a Catholic, family man and on the other, the single gay of Jewish roots, representative of the capital."

Finally, I just want to let you see what he said on Chávez:

"Chávez is good for Russia because he trades well with us. Let's pray that his successors trade with Russia as he did. That's what's important for us."

Somehow I have the impression some Russians nowadays have a similar attitude to the one Russians had during Czarist times...with a little bit of Soviet manners on top of that.

Mr Travkin:

If you don't know, Maduro also has Jewish roots, from his father's side. And he is probably much less of a Catholic than Capriles, if that matters to you.

Venezuela has many issues but hatred towards gays and Jews is not as prevalent in Venezuela as in Russia. Capriles is of Jewish roots and he is Catholic. He says he is not gay but if he were: would you hate him? In any case, you can talk about that with Putin, who also seems to be obsessed with the sex preferences of people.

Russian airplanes for Venezuela

It seems the Venezuelan government plans to buy 50 Russian air planes An-148 and Be-200, according to Russian officials in Caracas.

I wonder if Diosdado's visit to Moscow also touched this topic. They badly need an air plane now that their Airbus is (was?) conked out.

Some people are talking about Venezuela also possibly purchasing a Superjet 100, one like this.

Darth Cabello in Russia

Boligarch supremo and head of the National Assembly Diosdado Cabello is flying to Russia on Monday.

According to Chávez's putative child Nicolás Maduro, Cabello is delivering Putin a letter of "congratulation from the Chavista soul" (sic). Don't ask me to interpret that, I haven't smoked today.

But apart from that, the former coup monger Cabello will meet Russian officials and try to talk about further military and intelligence cooperation.

Readers should remember Venezuela owns Russians over 4.4 billion dollars thanks to Chávez's last wish list of arms. Russians gave Chávez a loan that will allow us - or rather the Venezuelan military - to import some extra weapons in the coming years. Since 2004 Venezuela has spent some 11 billion dollars in Russian defence hardware. If you think Russians cared for Assad, consider this: Chavista Venezuela is a much  better client.

Chavistas need to tinker further with the election system. They need better SIGINT support to spy on the opposition. Will and can they get any help from Putin's boys?