Russia and us

Putin's Palace

I recently read Catherine Belton's Putin's People. I can recommend the book about how the ruling class in today's Russia came to be and how it is interacting with the West. 

I do not agree with everything journalist Catherine Belton writes there. Still, I think she presents a huge amount of insights and hypothesis from which we can start many interesting discussions. Her statements should be considered in political circles in the EU, in Britain and in the rest of the West. 

Other specialists on Russia like Mark Galeotti have a different stance, they consider Putin's Russia is above all an adhocracy and they think the siloviki, the members of the security apparatus in Russia, are not that powerful and rather a bunch of improvisers. 

For me, the discussion whether Putin and his cronies came and remain in power as part of a master plan conceived by the  KGB  or whether the current situation is the result of a chain of trials and errors by some thuggish clan is less interesting than getting to know more details about what the siloviki have been up to in general.

Michael Kimmage wrote a rather negative review of Belton's book, which you can read it here. I bought the book after reading that review, I agree with some of Kimmage's points and yet I still found the book invaluable. Perhaps it is because I think most people can discern what is sheer speculation, what falls into the realm of cliches and what are actual facts or very probably facts. When I read a book that is on politics I do not expect to find a single idea explaining how some part of the universe came to be but get some pieces of concrete information and some possible explanations I can judge upon. 

You can watch some interviews with Belton in English here and here and in Russian here. I particularly liked the interview in Russian as the one doing the interview is taking the view of a Russian. You can read a more positive review on the book here and another one here by Princeton historian Stephen Kotkin. You can find many more on the Web on your own.

Some of the things I like, in no particular order:

1. there are references galore one can check out. Even if there are many anonymous sources and a lot of statements from individuals who are clearly biased against the ones in power in Russia now, there are also a lot of other sources one can delve into in order to judge by oneself
2. there is a lot of information about Igor Sechin, the Gazprom man.
3. Gazprom appearance and expansion is explained in full detail. Admittedly, there is too much of a Khodorkovsky perspective but again, I think any person who has been interested in Russia for some time can separate the wheat from the chaff here.
4. there are interesting pieces about the role of former Stasi members in the relationships between Europe and Russia. It is not only Matthias Warnig but Martin Schlaff and some others.
5. also some background on Nikolai Patrushev.
6. one can also read a lot of interesting information about the Beslan and Moscow Hostage crises

I liked less the final chapter, on how several characters linked to the Russian security services and how they were lobbying in the USA, in particular helping Trump to gain power. I do think Trump is more than compromised when it comes to Russia: many loans to his companies can be traced back to Russia, Trump's state of mind makes him love strongmen like Putin, he has repetedly show his man-love to Putin in a way that has been very embarrassing for the US intelligence agencies, to say the least. Still, the whole chapter seemed like a bit disconnected from the rest. One could have said there there are just as useful and often unconscious fools within the EU or Britain. Why a whole chapter for Trump? I am sure the current Russian government still would prefer for Trump to be re-elected but the last chapter should perhaps have been more general or have gone more into a discussion about what policies the West can develop.

As others mentioned, Belton gives a lot of credit to her contact Pugachev. She mentions a recording with his voice that was discovered after he left his house. I would be a bit careful about any recording, whatever its content.

As Kimmage wrote, Belton does not discuss much of the latest blunders the Russian regime has made. That is definitely a pity.

For those interested in what the siloviki are doing in Syria or Venezuela: you will find nothing of it in the book (there is only one single reference to the money Russia has loaned to Venezuela, for instance). Still, the book is very insightful and even more so for Venezuelans who want to have the big picture and who want to see where the Chavista regime is getting some of its ideas and support from. Igor Sechin, for instance, has big stakes in Venezuela and this book shows you a lot of where he is coming from. The money laundering parts are also very illuminating to understand how all these regimes work.

All in all, Belton's book is worth reading.

¿Por qué la dictadura en Venezuela no ha terminado como la de Ceasescu en Rumania?

Presentaré aquí algunas observaciones del historiador Yuval Noah Harari y mis comentarios respecto a Venezuela...hay cosas similares pero otras muy distintas.

Harari explicaba en su libro Homo Deus cómo Ceausescu y sus colaboradores lograron subyugar a veinte millones de rumanos durante cuatro décadas.

Según Harari, los líderes del régimen comunista consiguieron mantenerse en el poder tanto tiempo porque

1) pusieron a funcionarios comunistas leales a controlar todas las redes de cooperación, desde el ejército hasta las asociaciones deportivas

2) impidieron la creación de organizaciones rivales en el plano político, económico o social

3) contaron con el apoyo de partidos comunistas similares en la URSS y otros países de Europa oriental.

Harari, como es normal, advierte que la historia no se repite pero puede ayudar a dicernir tendencias.

Yo hablaría de patrones. 

Revisemos los tres puntos.

1) El chavismo ha sufrido un montón de deserciones pero como desde hace décadas el movimiento es profundamente criminal, las deserciones mismas no tienen autoridad moral...y los que quedan se vuelven más leales al régimen porque saben que después solo vendrá la prisión o el exilio en Rusia...y pocos venezolanos sin trabajo quieren ir a Rusia (aunque aumenta su número cada mes).

2) El chavismo no ha impedido la creación de organizaciones como lo hizo el comunismo europeo sino que ha tomado el camino putinista: ha inhabilitado y encarcelado a un montón de gente y hace seguimiento con tecnología cubana, rusa y cubana, de las comunicaciones de miles de opositores.

El chavismo ante todo ha usado el método antiquísimo de divide et impera que se usa hasta en sistemas menos represivos. Los venezolanos, que muy difícilmente trabajan en equipos igualitarios, sin un caudillito que los rija y prometa, no han conseguido enfocarse en un movimiento con principios y solo han trabajado en plataformas electorales para tal o cual líder del momento.

3) El chavismo cuenta no solo con los servicios de espionaje cubanos sino con el apoyo de Putin, quien por menos valor estratégico en Siria ha estado dispuesto a mandar soldados y cientos de mercenarios a ese país de Cercano Oriente. 

En particular la oposición venezolana no ha sabido cómo coordinar nada con movimientos opositores en Cuba y mucho menos ha sabido cómo influir en el público cubano en general.

Rumania durante las masacres perpetradas por el régimen de Ceasescu

Actualmente el cambio también es más difícil porque falta el elemento sorpresa. Y es que lo que ocurrió en 1989 tomó a casi todos desprevenidos. Muy pocas personas tenían la perspectiva general y específica de los cambios que se producían en diversas regiones del mundo en aquel entonces, de lo que ocurría con la carrera armamentista, con los precios del petróleo, con la fosilización de las estructuras económicas soviéticas, con el desarrollo de la informática en Occidente, con el flujo de información que finalmente entraba en Hungría y otros países del Bloque Socialista (Comunista).

Actualmente los movimientos "socialistas" (o como quieran llamarlos) y Rusia putinista están obsesionados con reconocer a tiempo cualquier grupo o movimiento que pueda poner en peligro su control de los países satélites. En eso se parecen más a la Rusia de Stalin, pero con software de espionaje.

El comunismo (o socialismo de Estado o como se quiera llamar) murió hace mucho tiempo en Rusia. Aun así, el putinismo se basa en muchas de sus estructuras y prácticas - es una mezcla de métodos soviéticos con economía de mercado con cronismo post-soviético y mitos y ritos sacados de la Rusia imperial. Si Uds leen la prensa rusa oficialista, si leen la entrevista que le hicieran al embajador ruso en Venezuela, que yo comenté en una entrada anterior, notarán cómo se menciona una y otra vez que tal o cual grupo en Venezuela o en la misma Rusia quiere hacer una nueva "Revolución de los Colores", como se llamaron los movimientos en países que trataron de escapar de la influencia de Rusia a partir de los 2000 (ya no se habla de las revoluciones que se produjeron en 1989 en Europa Central y Oriental).

El chavismo emplea trucos parecidos a los que emplea Putin en Rusia y lo consigue pese a que Maduro, al contrario que Putin en Rusia, es odiado por la gigantesca mayoría de la población.

El chavismo ha conseguido neutralizar a los pocos opositores que tienen un mínimo de capacidad retórica y posible atractivo para las masas. No es difícil en un país donde el político promedio no lee un libro al año.

El chavismo se aprovecha de un proceso de cansancio durante el que la oposición luchó sin organización, sin estrategia, con todos los petrodólares en contra.

El chavismo se aprovecha del mayor movimiento de emigración en décadas: estos millones que huyen del hambre y la criminalidad de Venezuela chavista no estarán allí para protestar.

Si queremos salir del chavismo esta década y convertir Venezuela en un país democrático, pluralista y en vías de desarrollo, debemos ser mucho más creativos y persistentes.

Venezuela, gender, work and politics (I)

Gender distribution in 4 parishes of central Venezuela: males are shown with dash, females with continuous lines

Look at these statistics based on Venezuela's 2011 census. They show how many males and females live in four areas in Central Venezuela. All are urban, even if some were formerly villages that became part of Greater Valencia. The areas -parroquias or civil parishes- are:

• San José - Northern Valencia, mostly middle class and the tiny upper middle class (SJ)
• Tocuyito - just Southwest of Valencia, the place is by far the most dangerous area in the whole state
• Los Guayos - formerly a humble village, now the most densely populated municipality of Carabobo, as poor as Tocuyito
• Urdaneta - South-Eastern Valencia, rather poor and one of the areas where the opposition tried to protest in March of last year but where several people got killed. As I wrote in a post back then, continuous protests in areas like this - there were many others- showed it was not an "uprise of the upper middle class": the poor were also mad, but protesting in areas where the opposition has "only" 60% of support instead of 80% or more can be rather lethal.

We can see the obvious: the poorer the region, the more children there are. Still, there is something curious here: although all these regions are urban, Tocuyito is the only area where there are just as many men as women from age 18 onwards. We know in many countries there is a particular gender inbalance depending on whether the region is poorer or richer. From Africa there is currently a mostly male migration now. The same goes for Arab states. In Eastern Germany, it has been women who first leave the rural and backward areas to look for better horizons. The same goes for rural China. In rural Venezuela we can also see a clear, sometimes dramatic surplus of men.

But what is going on here? Is Tocuyito just a transition region that was not so long ago a rural area? I doubt that is the case. Tocuyito also has a prison. It was conceived for 1200 inmates, but it has now well over 3000 and the vast majority are males. Is that all or are there some other factors that explain why there are clearly proportionately more women in the other areas? Do men in Libertador live healthier lives or else?

The following chart shows the percentage of people between 18 and 24 years old who are following courses at a college or university in the areas mentioned above. What are the young males in Libertador who are not studying doing? Are they working? How many? In what jobs?

We'll examine a wider area in future posts to discuss possible reasons for these demographic patterns.

Hugo Carvajal, a perspective

In January 2014 one of the best known Dutch newspapers, De Telegraaf, published an article about  the retired general Hugo Carvajal. A few of the issues it stated were:

• Aruba is worried about the nomination of Carvajal, a general suspected of being involved in drug dealings as Venezuelan consul
• Carvajal has been linked to the torture and killing of two Colombian military men
• The US had him in the Clinton list since 2008 in relation to drug trafficking and the FARC

The Aruban Parliament had been discussing this back then. Opposition deputy Evelyn Wever-Croes from the MEP party had demanded from the Aruban government an explanation. The government responded it was up to Den Haag to decide whether to accept or not the man as a consul. 

Maduro had signed that nomination 16 January of 2014.

There are lots of Venezuelan "diplomats" in the Netherlands and in the ABC islands and it seems incredible none of them read that article. Why was Carvajal going to Aruba at this stage in a private airplane?

Hugo Carvajal was born in 1960. There are two versions about his birth place: Puerto La Cruz, Anzoátegui or Viejo Fresco, close to Maturín, in the Western Llanos (not far from where Diosdado Cabello was born). I believe the right location is the latter. His sister, Wilma Carvajal, is the mayor of the Cedeño municipality, close to Maturín. She won over Pedro Emilio Briceño. I mentioned Briceño's clan in another post about gangsters from the Maturín region. Nepotism was always an issue in Venezuela but we keep reaching new levels.

Back to Hugo Carvajal: he finished his military studies in 1981.

In February 1992 he took part in the bloody coup led by Hugo Chávez. Carvajal was called "the other Hugo" and he was in the same prison with the caudillo until president Rafael Caldera set them free in 1994.

He worked for the Venezuelan Military Intelligence (DIM) from 2002 and he became its head in 2004. In April 2002 he was in Russia for training when the coup against Chávez took place and he came right away from Moscow. He arrived in Caracas and, handling a machine gun, asked everyone he met in the state buildings who was against Chávez. He was one of the first who got into the Miraflores building. He became colonel and vice-head of the Military Intelligence. 2 years later, in 2004, he became the head of the institution. He remained there until 2011.

Carvajal was in charge with negotiating the liberation of Richard Boulton, who was kidnapped by the FARC.

In 2008 United States accused him of cooperating with the FARC. Chávez defended him.

In 2012 opposition deputy Ismael García wrote on his Twitter account someone told him Carvajal and a judge had left the country. This was false but: is there something about this?

24 April 2013 Maduro named him head of Military Counterintelligence, which is the new DIM. If you visit the site of that organisation you will see they don't even update the dates (2012 is the latest).

In 2014, when Maduro decided to send Carvajal to Aruba, he named general Iván Rafael Hernández Dala (born in 1966) the new head of the Military Counterintelligence. Hernández Dala had been colonel until mid 2013.

What game is being played here? What can Ismael García tell us now? Why did Maduro think it was a wise move to propose Carjaval as consul to Aruba? Or did he just sign something proposed by someone else? Who was that?

Maduro, al-Assad und as-Sissi oder "ein Esel gefällt dem anderen"

Der venezolanische Machtshaber Nicolas Maduro hat nun al-Assad in Syrien und as-Sissi in Ägypten für ihre Wahlsiege gratuliert.

Dass Maduro den Massenmörder al-Assad gratulieren würde, war von jedem zu erwarten. Die al-Assad-Diktatur war mit der Chávez-Regierung seit je eng befreundet. Viele Venezolaner-Araber, deren Eltern oder Grosseltern aus dieser Region stammen sind zur Zeit Bonzen in der Maduro-Regierung. Dass Maduro sich aber auch mit Lob an den Militärcaudillo as-Sissi wenden würde, hat mich schon ein bisschen überrascht, denn vom Autoritarismus mal abgesehen hatten sie bis jetzt nicht viel zu tun gehabt. Vielleicht hat Maduro einfach gesehen, dass die US-Amerikaner sich von as-Sissi distanzieren wollen. Vielleicht sehnt sich Maduro für mehr Anerkennung und will an jede Tür klopfen.

Tarek El-Aissami, einer der syrisch-venezolanischen Bonzen

Two very different questions

1) What happened to the US American who was detained last August in Western Venezuela and was accused of spying or somehow plotting against the Chávez government? Chávez announced the whole thing. The US confirmed one of its citizens had been detained. After that, neither the Venezuelan nor the US government have discussed the issue.

2) What has happened to the process against Boligarc Arné Chacón (the brother of top honcho and military man Jesse Chacón) for corruption? He was set free in December 30 because he had been in prison for 2 years without any trial taking place. Will there be a process? Who will know about its results? Can the public see any of it? Didn't he steal hundreds of millions? 

Schnee von gestern? Water under the bridge? ¿Pasó a la historia?

The French the French are not talking about

I found this funny: Frédéric Bouquet is a French Venezuelan security forces detained in 2009 together with a couple of Dominicans. The Venezuelan authorities accused Bouquet of being a member of a foreign security service, of illegally carrying weapons galore and planning some violent action, possibly trying to murder Hugo Chávez. Yesterday he was freed together with some other people like the investors from Econoinvest and Jesse Chacón's brother, Arné Chacón. The Russians, the Canadians, the Dutch, the US Americans reported on that. Iris Varela herself twitted the announcement. In France, only a provincial (although popular) newspaper, Ouest France, reported it. And then French conspiracy theorists from the left started to write about why the mainstream media was so quiet this time. And I have to say: they might be right. Why?

CNN said El Aissami had mentioned back in 2009 Monsieur Bouquet had spent some time in training in Israel. Here you can read more information from the Venezuelan side, and also here.

Est-ce qu'on en va laisser tomber cela?

The noisy American

Well, I am referring to Chávez, as he is, after all, a South American. He confirmed there was a US agent who was detained on a bus heading from Colombia to what I assume is Barinas. Venezuelan diplomats in Washington informed the US government about it directly and not through the customary channel, the US embassy in Caracas, which probably just means Venezuelan Bolivarian diplomats didn't know the usual procedure.

In any case: this looks like fun. How on Earth does a US agent arrive to Venezuela with a passport that has entry stamps for Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria? What do you think? Is he really a mercenary? A weapons dealer? A joke?

When criminal regimes support criminal regimes

You can measure the health of democracy in a country is by looking at the governments that country's leadership prefers to support. Right now we read that diplomats from Venezuela, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Cuba are in Syria to support the bloody dictatorship in place there for several decades now. They do not seem to care about the thousands of civilians who  have been murdered by the Assad regime. 

The world should know about this: Chávez's regime and its puppets in the region are supporting Assad's atrocities.

The Russians won't let go

Venezuela has spent at least 7 billion dollars in Russian weapons.  A few days ago, Russia's government approved a $4 billion  loan for the Venezuelan military caste to buy more defence material. A part of the loan will be paid in 2012 and a part in 2013.

Russia's Vice-Prime Minister, Igor Sechin, a very close ally of Putin and like Putin a member of the secret service oligarc club, went to Venezuela for the talks. Mr Sechin has been very involved in weapons' deals since his KGB times.

Newspaper Kommersant asked Russian officials why Russia was giving credit to a country with such huge oil reserves. The official said the following: "Chávez is our partner and hence the survival of his regime (sic) is in the interest of Russia. He will use the petrodollars in social programmes. That is why we at the VTS (War-Technical Cooperation Department) can support him"

Подробнее:http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1789563?isSearch=True

What are the consequences?

We have reason to believe some Venezuelan military must have got more than a spasibo-note from the Russians for pushing with the Venezuelan caudillo to incur further debts on weapons. This is leading to more corruption and still less desire for a government change.

Will Venezuela become more of a danger for the outside world? We believe not. The military will become an even bigger threat to Venezuelan civilians.

As for the Russians: their secret services, which at least since Litvinenko we know are more interlinked with the mafia than ever thought, are going to see to it Russia doesn't lose such a customer as Venezuela under Chávez.

If you want to understand how deluded Venezuela's caudillo is, you just have to read his latest statement on oil reserves: "in the Orinoco Belt we have oil for 200 years. The rest of the world will run out of oil in the coming 100 years and we will keep exporting".

This man never asked himself what it means to have 200 years of oil...at what extraction rate? for how many consumers? what will happen with supply and demand? what will happen with alternative forces of energy in 20, 30 years - let's not go to a longer term -.

One of the  most difficult tasks the Venezuelan alternative forces have ahead is to inform everyone about the pernitious cargo cult the country has developed. Oil could help us get some finance to invest in sustainable development if we make very important changes, but we are running out of time.

Meanwhile, the Venezuelan regime said the budget for 2012 should be calculated with an oil barrel at $50. The reason for this is to avoid sending much money to the local governments - and thus, to a lot of areas under opposition administration - and to divert the petrodollars - we are talking probably about at least $40 per barrel - to populist actions announced by Chávez himself.

Asinus asinum fricat - iterum

The head of Belarus' Central Bank is Nadezhda Jermakova...Nadezhda means "hope" and that is what the Belarussian regime is desperately clinging to. Nadezhda Jermakova has just announced her country got 300 million euros in credits from Iran.

Belarus is basically bankrupt and it is being kept alive only through aid from other autocracies: from Venezuela's military regime through the years, from Russia and from Iran now. They all know: if Belarus' dictatorship goes, people in Russia, Iran and Venezuela will start to get some ideas. Venezuelans are getting those ideas already now. But what if Belarussians also start to protest more?

It is no coincidence that the Belorussians are visiting the Venezuelan caudillo these days...to keep alive the promise that yes, they will complete the 20000 houses they have promised over the years...and so much more.

Venezuela at the end of 2011

The situation

Venezuela is not getting the money it should get from the the oil industry because PDVSA is in bad shape, corruption keeps growing and the president, who rules Venezuela as if it were his personal farm, is ill...or terminaly ill, or faking to be ill, depending on whom you ask.

We read that Akhmadinejad is not coming to Venezuela because Chávez is too ill (his chancellor, Maduro, said it is "waiting a few weeks for the completion of the healing programme".

The country is experiences protests everywhere. People protest and often don't know what their ultimate plan is. They want the State to help. Sometimes they want security, which is very much their right. Sometimes they want help in social housing, which is very much fair. Sometimes they want houses for free, which is not stupid and can only be possible in a place where most follow a cargo cult. Sometimes they want the government to improve their conditions that deteriorated after some of them asked the government to privatize their companies. Sometimes they are fed up of the way in which health services are collapsing. A lot are angry because blackouts and general electricity shortages are our daily bread. People close streets everywhere, burn tyres, make a lot of noise and the ones who suffer the most are other civilians. The mood is bad. The honchos in power are fine.

Daniel wrote about how the government wants now to limit profit in Venezuela to 10% while that same government is overpaying Nicaraguan and Iranian and Chinese exporters for political reasons. Inflation is almost 30%.The IMF predicts GDP growth of 2.7% and the Venezuelan government annouced that as a big achievement, but that is only because most people don't know how to interpret GDP growth. Venezuela has a population growth that is almost 2%, it has had over 15% more revenues due to higher oil prices since 2010, it is the slowest growing country in South America. You can't compare 2.7% of Venezuela with 1% for Germany.

The Forecast

What can you expect in the coming three months?

A lot depends on Chávez's real or perceived health status. Beyond that, we can expect the following:

1) the Chávez honchos are again increasing the personality cult around Chávez. This will reach even more mental levels in the coming months.

2) more money will flow from Fonden and other state resources to the Chávez campaign.

3) the regime will put more efforts on trying to use Leopoldo López to divide the alternative forces.

At the same time we will see an increase in the competition between the different pre-candidates for the opposition. If this is carried out in a fair manner, it could benefit democracy in Venezuela. If not, obviously, we will have more military government to come.

Expect Russia and China to meddle more and more in Venezuela's affairs. Venezuela means too easy money for them. The Chinese can become more flexible when it comes to accepting a regime change. The Russians know they will lose one of their best buyer of weapons. As the CEO of Rosobonexport, Anatolii Isaikin, declared, Venezuela was one of the five countries on which the Russian merchants of war count, together with huge China, India plus Algeria and Vietnam.

I take this picture from Miguel's post...here you see Venezuelan chancellor in a "mass" organized in Mannhattan to pray for the caudillo's health

What do you think Chávez told Gaddafi?

I read in Lenta some people think- again - that Gaddafi is getting ready to leave Libya. The Libyan dictator would apparently be ready to transfer power to his minister of Justice - if there is a cease fire and "NATO forces leave Libya". Fat chance. Anyway: two Airbuses came from South Africa. Some of Gaddafis relatives and government honchos may consider going to Venezuela.

There is a Venezuelan representative (or shall I say a Chávez representative) talking to Gaddafi officials in the Tunesian island of Djerba.

Is this true or yet another rumour? Or do Gaddafi's relatives reckon Venezuela may still be a good place for shopping? Stay tuned.

Should I go? How long could I stay there?

Das sind Experten: Ägypten und vieles mehr

Peter Scholl-Latour und Michael Lüders sprechen hier über die Situation in den vorwiegend muslimischen Ländern. Ich wünschte mir, man könnte solche Analyse auch auf Spanisch bzw auf Englisch hören.

Der Moderator stellt manchmal blöde Fragen, das Interview ist aber im allgemeinen sehr gut.

Ich frage mich: und wie wäre es, wenn die Proteste auch auf Libyen übergreifen könnten? Schön wäre es. Ich glaube aber nicht, dass das in den nächsten Jahren geschehen kann. Libyens Bevölkerung ist zu klein und sie war schon lange zu abgeschottet, als dass die Menschen dort sich trauen würden, gegen Khadaffis Schurken zu protestieren.

Wenn es den Ägyptern aber gelingen würde, langsam den Weg der Demokratie einzuschlagen, würde dies auch irgendwann das Ende der Diktatur in Libyen bedeuten.

Was kann Europa noch tun? In alternative Energien massiv investieren. Das wäre gut für Europa, für die Umwelt, aber auch für alle Erdölländer, die jetzt von Despoten regiert werden. Ein Problem stellt sich aber immer mehr: wer wird die Seltenen Erden liefern? Kasachstan etwa? Venezuela? Die Weltmacht China?

The West's pathetic limping

When are the EU and the US going to understand they cannot longer bet on dictators to keep "balance" in the world? If they put pressure on Lukashenko, why on Earth are they not doing that on Mubarak? Because of the Muslim Brotherhood? Keep dreaming you are going to make things better by keeping up a dictator with Mubarak's track record. The longer dictators -of one or the other flavour and colour- are supported, the bigger the pressure the cooker will have.

If you want to fight Islamic extremism or any other extremism, you have to go full monty and be consistent. There is no simple solution and a change has a lot of dangers and it needs to be monitored not for a week or a month, but for years. And still, a real change must come and democracy now is needed.

And meanwhile Netanjahu and the Israeli right wingers are running telling everyone a sort of Hamas is going to get hold of Egypt.

Do you know what?



It smells fishy and it's not kosher





Yes, the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups are a real danger (we remember Iran). But no, we cannot just keep the side of dictators. We need to look for other solutions. Mubarak won't be helpful. He had 30 years to do that.

Does Bibi want Israel to remain "the only democracy in the Middle East"?

How many hands are politicians prepared to shake?







Omar Suleiman, the Security Man of Egypt

I read Haaretz and find something that corresponds very much with what I see coming from Israeli sources: the government apparently wants the US and the European Union to go on betting on Mubarak "less the Islamic fundamentalists come to power". And they create fear by stressing the fact the Muslim Brotherhood supports El-Baradeid.

And I read in Spiegel (also with reference to Haaretz) that prime minister Westerwelle is afraid of a fundamentalist wave.

Yes, indeed, fundamentalism is a danger, but then: for how long are Western countries going to let dictators be the solution? Do they think Islamic fundamentalism will become less dangerous or be kept under control like that? Does anyone remember how the West supported the removal of Mohammad Mosaddegh in Iran? And then the dictatorship that followed with the Shah? And what happened then when the Islamic fundamentalists took power? What is still very much happening? And does anyone remember what happened after Qassim in Iraq was overthrown with Western influence?

And why did the US government not speak of road to democracy before these events took place? Did it not know of the repression Mubarak's regime was carrying out for years now? Is there a transition still possible under Mubarak now?

So many questions...

As usual, I recommend reading Robert Fisk's account

Are there better ways to confront obscurantism and fundamentalism? Is the Muslim Brotherhood evolving differently in different countries? If so: why?











El Baradei
Can he and the Egyptian people get a chance?

Wikileak Norway-USA-Venezuela, the original

I had forgotten, in Aftenposten there is a link to the original Wikileak in English. Please, take a look here.

And for background on that, read journalist Setty's account.

Egypt and Venezuela

I find annoying the way every group is trying to take the Egypt's events to portray their side in Venezuela.

We have facts like these

• The US government has supported dictator Mubarak for a long time thinking that is the way to prevent Islamic fundamentalism taking power there
• The government of Israel is very interested in keeping Mubarak or someone with his attitude in Egypt
  

and Chávez's useful idiots and main honchos hint at the fact the protests in Egypt are more against the US and more for "something like Chávez".

Then we have things like these:

• Mubarak is a military, like Chávez, and he thinks, just like the Venezuelan caudillo, that he is irreplaceable
• Mubarak abhors open debates with the opposition, he prefers monologues, like Chávez
  

In reality geopolitics is way more complex than that.

One of the best commentators about the Middle East is Robert Fisk. I would suggest readers to take a look at what he has to say. Not curiously, he is a bit more cautious than many other "experts" on Middle East matters.

I hope Egypt will be soon a pluralistic, open society. I am afraid it won't be so soon -too many groups from many sides in many countries do not want this. As the saying goes, extremes meet.

One thing I know no extremes want is an open and free debate.

While the World is reading Wikileaks

I find most of the Wikileaks so far non-news. You could have inferred most from reading some alternatives sources in English plus non-English, non-Latin language press. It is just very telling so many people in the West are impressed by the "revelations". There are some concrete issues that particular organisations have to deal with. The German Liberal Party (FDP) now knows a young member of their negotiation team with the CDU is giving confidential information to the U.S. Americans. Everybody knows now that Khadaffi's blond nurse is Ukrainian. We also know now Prince Andrew was quite rude particularly during a certain visit to Central Asia. The unkosher-unhalal-un-Catholic ways of putting pressure on foreign countries? The request for DNA material, details that would allow spying on UN and all the rest? Nothing new. If you want to read a good analysis on the Wikileaks about the Middle East, read Fisk.

Some of the world events I found most interesting and which escaped the attention of most are these:

• Haiti's elections became an absolute farce. If you speak German or even if you don't, watch this (from 16:31, Wahl stürzt Haiti ins nächste Chaos). Lots of countries and organisations are profiting from pretending to help Haiti. Some of them even believe they are helping. Few actually do something effective, like Oxfam or Doctors without Borders. Carroll wrote a good article about aid agencies in Haiti (see here).
  

• Egypt's elections became a farce as well. Read again Fisk for that one here.

• Two nuclear technology specialists in Iran were killed. Iran says they were killed by Israel (Mossad someone?). Others say they were killed by the Iranians themselves in their internal struggles.

• I wonder how China's government will be so interested in the Koreas becoming reunified, as the US employees think. I am not so sure that is the case. If North Korea joined South Korea, China would have a pluralistic country much closer to Beijing. This could set out dynamics not so wanted by the PCP.

Chauvinism as a way to improve popularity for Latin military

Nicaragua's regime is losing popularity. It is also causing a lot of trouble for Costa Rica as it is throwing the rubbish from dredging works of a river to the Costa Rican side (Costa Ricans say), its economic and political mess leads to a lot of illegal immigration to Costa Rica and criminals from Nicaragua keep crossing to Costa Rica for booty. Costa Rican authorities have been protesting and increased the amount of police forces at the border -Costa Rica has no military-. What does the Nicaraguan government do? It sends troops to occupy territory in Costa Rica (Isla Calero). The Organisation of American States held an emergency meeting. The vast majority of countries voted to ask Nicaragua to take away its troops. The Nicaraguan military who led his troops to occupy the Island Calcero blamed it on Google Maps, which did not show the proper border. You know...el imperio es culpa de todo.

Who voted for Costa Rica?

21 countries.

Who absteened? Ecuador, Guyana and Dominica (these last two get a lot of oil from Venezuela).

Bolivia did not even bother to vote.

Who rejected the proposal? Nicaragua and the envoys of Venezuela's military junta.

This is such a waste of resources for all Spanish Americans. It is simply stupid, stupid, stupid. You can bet the Venezuelan military will try to keep the conflict going, though.


Some background information in Spanish here and in English here.